many possibilities blog: Systemantics: what is causing the trend away from freedom to statism in the US?

Here is a drawing ( parties as arrows instead of dots) showing that the recent trend of the political spectrum in the US is to move away from limited government, freedom, and capitalism toward statism, force, and socialism.

How to read the arrows:

Head = recent practice. Shaft = where that coalition came from.
Democrats: into the administrative band (more center, more mandate).
GOP establishment: same band, different color — security and industrial management.
MAGA: out of the oval toward national levers; rhetoric still talks back toward federalism.
A small teal remnant still points at the oval. That is the SPOTM political target, not a current majority.

This trend is very disturbing. What are the causes of it? What laws are involved in this trend?

The arrows move the way you describe when crises, coalitions, and complex systems all have one-direction ratchets. The “laws” below—mostly stylized regularities from political economy, organization theory, and the system fiasco canon—explain why expansion is easier than rollback.

Crisis and permanence

Higgs’s Ratchet Effect: emergencies expand state power; peacetime rollbacks are partial, so size/authority stair-step upward.
Friedman’s Law of Temporary Programs: nothing is so permanent as a temporary government program; sunsets rarely set.
Precautionary/Regulatory Ratchet: once a risk is publicly named, regulation only tightens; deregulatory moves face asymmetric blame.

Coalitions and incentives

Olson’s Logic of Collective Action: concentrated beneficiaries out-lobby diffuse taxpayers; addition beats subtraction.
Stigler’s Capture: regulators drift toward the interests they regulate; rules accrete around incumbents.
Pournelle’s Iron Law of Bureaucracy: those loyal to the organization’s survival outcompete those loyal to its mission; expansion is the safe career bet.
Iron Triangle Dynamic: agencies, committees, and client groups reinforce each other’s budgets and mandates.

Elections and demographics

Wagner’s Law: as incomes rise and societies age/urbanize, demand for public services and transfers rises.
Median Voter Theorem: parties converge toward where 50%+1 lives; if the median wants more insurance/services, platforms migrate that way.
Path Dependence/Increasing Returns (North/Arthur): once programs create networks/expectations, exit costs grow; lock-in.

Measurement, ideas, and attention

Goodhart’s/Campbell’s Law: when a metric becomes a target, it gets gamed; fixes require new layers, not fewer.
Law of Unintended Consequences (Cobra Effect): interventions produce side-effects that justify further interventions.
Availability/Present Bias: voters and politicians overweight immediate, seen benefits vs. diffuse, delayed costs; “print and mandate” wins news cycles.

Complex systems behavior (Systemantics/Murphy)

Gall/Systemantics: complex systems that work evolved from simpler ones; bolt‑ons degrade reliability and demand more bolt‑ons.
Function Creep Law: a system given one task will find others; mission expands to fit capacity (and then expands capacity).
Murphy’s Law (with Finagle’s corollary): what can go wrong will—especially at interfaces; failures prompt safeguards that add complexity, not simplicity.

Engineering-style cost laws (Augustine)

Augustine’s Curve: the last 10% of performance costs most of the money and creates most of the problems; political “gold-plating” drives cost/complexity upward.
Schedule/Scope Creep Law: to meet dates, add resources; added coordination makes you later; slippage begets oversight begets slippage.
“Cheaper is expensive” dynamic: cutting corners up front raises lifecycle costs; programs justify larger permanent support tails.

How these map to your diagnosis

Crisis ratchet + interest groups are the motor (Higgs, Olson, Pournelle, Stigler, Friedman).
Ideas/metrics tilt the field (Goodhart/Campbell, precautionary ratchet), rewarding visible action over invisible restraint.
Demographic and coalition shifts move the median (Wagner, Median Voter, path dependence), shaping which expansions are politically safest.
Short-horizon culture and media incentives amplify all of the above (present bias/availability), making “say yes now, sort it out later” the dominant strategy.
Once built, the administrative system behaves like any large system (Systemantics/Murphy/Augustine): self-preserving, complexity‑seeking, rollback‑resistant.

Corollaries if you want the arrows to bend back

Make “temporary” real: hard sunsets with default-off and supermajority renewals counter Higgs/Friedman.
Change who is organized: fund broad, rule‑level constituencies (taxpayer/consumer) to offset Olson’s asymmetry.
Design for simplicity first: small, general rules beat bespoke programs (Gall); cap interfaces and metrics to avoid Goodhart spirals.
Build off-ramps: automatic de-escalators tied to outcomes reduce precautionary and capture ratchets.
Pay lifecycle costs up front: force cost/benefit and maintenance budgeting early (Augustine), or complexity wins by default.

Systemantics and Murphy say systems drift toward maximum complication; Augustine says the bill for that drift arrives late and large. Public-choice laws say organized winners will gladly pay it with someone else’s wallet. Put together, that’s why—absent deliberate counter-ratchets—the arrows tend to move away from limited government and toward thicker, more force-capable centers.

In addition:

Here’s a deeper cut you can use as a map and a checklist. In Murphy/Systemantics/Augustine fashion: systems drift toward maximal complication, failures justify safeguards, and the last 10% of “fix” costs 90% of the money.

More “laws” and regularities that fit your trend

Fiscal Illusion (Puviani/Buchanan): when costs are hidden (withholding, deficits, tax expenditures), voters demand more than they’d buy at visible prices.
Flypaper Effect: intergovernmental grants “stick” where they hit; federal money ratchets state/local scope up rather than replacing local funds.
Baumol’s Cost Disease: government-heavy sectors (education, health, safety) get relatively pricier over time even if productivity stalls—budget share rises.
Second-Best Theorem: with many distortions, removing one can make things worse—politics responds with layers, not subtractions.
Issue-Attention Cycle (Downs): bursts of attention reward visible action; the maintenance phase is invisible—so add now, forget later.
Kingdon’s Multiple Streams + Policy Entrepreneurship: problems, politics, and ready-made policy menus meet at “windows” (usually crises), then lock in.
Punctuated Equilibrium (Baumgartner/Jones): long stasis, short bursts of large change—almost always additive.
Niskanen’s Budget-Maximizing Bureaucrat: career safety tracks budget/mandate growth; shrinking is hazardous duty.
Shirky Principle: institutions preserve the problem they were created to solve.
Peltzman Effect: safety nets can raise risk-taking; follow-on regulation responds to the new risk—another layer.
Parkinson’s Law (and bikeshedding): work expands to fill the budget, and debate fixates on tractable minutiae—complexity without priority.
Brandolini’s Asymmetry: it takes 10× effort to refute bad ideas; regulation fights rumors faster than it sunsets rules.
Path Dependence/Lock-in: beneficiaries, vendor ecosystems, and compliance capital make reversal costly even when consensus shifts.

Mechanism sketch: how arrows move in practice

Shock or salience spike: crisis, scandal, or moral panic. Murphy’s corollary: the interface you didn’t test fails first.
Window opens: policy entrepreneurs push shelf-ready ideas (Kingdon). Prebuilt toolkits beat abstract restraint.
Coalition assembles: concentrated winners (Olson) out-organize diffuse payers; narratives frame action as precaution.
Layering not pruning: to avoid blame (regulator risk aversion), add a program or mandate; few dare to remove legacy parts (Systemantics).
Lock-in: budgets, grants, compliance systems, and court precedents create exit costs; metrics get gamed (Goodhart), prompting new metrics.
Drift and expansion: mission creep + function creep; “temporary” becomes platform (Friedman’s law). Augustine’s curve: the tail support costs take over.

How to diagnose the ratchet in your own data

Scope and complexity
- Pages/constraints in the Code of Federal Regulations; count of “major” rules per year; average length of statutes/appropriations.
- Active national emergency declarations and their duration.
Fiscal footprint
- Federal outlays and transfers as % of GDP; beneficiaries as a % of population; tax-expenditure totals (hidden spending).
- Federal grants to states per capita; the “stickiness” of grants after the originating crisis ends.
Administrative mass
- Full-time equivalents in agencies tied to recent crises; contractor counts; compliance hours reported by OMB.
Political demand
- Survey medians on risk, redistribution, and “government do more vs. less” by age, education, sex, and metro density.
- Turnout-weighted medians (who votes, not just who’s eligible).

Counter‑ratchets that have actually worked at least once

All‑or‑nothing fast tracks: package downsizing (e.g., base-closure style commissions) with no amendments and guaranteed vote; reduces Olson’s veto points.
Hard sunsets with default-off: renewal requires supermajority and a fresh cost–benefit; tie funding and authority to measured outcomes.
Regulatory budgets: one‑in‑X‑out or net‑burden caps at the rulebook level; forces trade-offs across agencies.
Grant design with off‑ramps: match requirements that rise over time and automatic phase-downs once indicators normalize.
Broad rules over bespoke programs: generality beats kludges (Systemantics: start simple or you’ll never get simple).
Independent scorekeeping + transparency: visible lifecycle costs blunt fiscal illusion; precommit the maintenance tail before launch.
“Losers-first” compensation: fund transition packages up front to dissolve concentrated opposition to repeal.

Why demographics and culture matter but don’t “decide”

Wagner’s and Baumol’s pressures raise baseline demand for social insurance as societies age and urbanize; the gender gap, education sorting, and metro density shift the median voter toward risk-buffering.
Media/attention economics compress time horizons; present bias rewards immediate visible benefits over diffuse, delayed costs—politically, addition dominates subtraction.
But ideas and design still bite: simple, general institutions with clean exits can resist the drift even with the same electorate.

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Here is the philosophical point of view on this subject

Several things are happening in the U.S. (especially since the late 2000s and accelerating through the 2010s–mid‑2020s) that push politics away from freedom, limited government, and capitalism and toward statism, coercion, and “soft” forms of socialism. From an Objectivist standpoint, the root is philosophical—bad ideas about reason, rights, and economics—but you can name the main proximate causes clearly.

Below are the major drivers, integrated into a coherent explanation.

1) A long-running collapse of trust, producing demand for “someone to take control”

When people believe society is chaotic, corrupt, or unintelligible, they become receptive to the idea that power (not principle) is the solution. Pew data show trust in the federal government remains very low compared with historical levels. (pewresearch.org)

Low trust does not automatically create liberty. More often it produces:

cynical factionalism (“our strongman vs. their strongman”),
acceptance of emergency powers,
and a view of politics as tribal warfare rather than principled government under objective law.

2) Crisis politics: “emergency” becomes the normal justification for coercion

The modern pattern is: crisis → “do something now” → executive/agency power expands → it never fully contracts.

The U.S. has had a sequence of major crises—financial, pandemic, supply-chain, geopolitical, etc.—and each becomes an excuse for controls, subsidies, mandates, censorship-by-proxy, industrial policy, and deficit spending. Once the public accepts “necessity has no law,” limited government is functionally dead.

3) Intellectual drift: capitalism is blamed for problems caused by mixed economy and controls

Public opinion data show capitalism’s reputation has weakened while socialism’s has improved, especially among some groups; e.g., Gallup reports capitalism favorability lower than earlier years and socialism rising (though “free enterprise” remains very popular—indicating confusion about terms). (news.gallup.com)

Objectivist diagnosis: people experience real problems (housing costs, healthcare dysfunction, credential inflation, regulatory cartels, bailouts, cronyism), and then misidentify the cause as “capitalism,” when much of it is the product of a long-standing mixed economy—government intervention plus politically connected business.

That misidentification fuels the demand for more intervention, which worsens the cycle.

4) Debt, deficits, and the political bribery of “something for nothing”

Massive ongoing deficits normalize the premise that:

you can consume without producing,
rights become “entitlements to goods,”
and the state can print/borrow prosperity into existence.

CBO projections have documented very large deficits and rising debt dynamics driven heavily by mandatory spending and interest costs. (cbo.gov)

In Reisman’s terms (economics): deficit finance and redistribution are not “compassion”—they are methods of transferring wealth and distorting capital formation, undermining long-run productivity while politically buying votes in the short run.

5) Growth of the administrative state: rule by agencies replaces rule by objective law

Even when Congress is gridlocked, government power expands through:

agency rulemaking,
enforcement discretion,
“guidance” documents,
and executive actions.

This is statism by structure: it bypasses objective, knowable, stable law—the political requirement of rights—and replaces it with managerial decree. The result is a culture where businesses and individuals increasingly must ask permission.

6) Tribal polarization makes force feel “necessary”

When politics becomes an all-out moral war, each side comes to see the other as an existential threat. That produces a predictable effect: willingness to use state power to crush opponents—regulations, deplatforming, selective prosecutions, weaponized investigations, etc.

This is the psychology of statism: if you believe your enemies are monsters, you will accept coercion “just this once.” Then it’s never “once.”

7) Cultural subjectivism: feelings replace facts; “my narrative” replaces reality

Objectivism holds that reason is man’s means of knowledge. But much of modern culture treats knowledge as:

group “standpoints,”
power narratives,
or subjective “lived experience.”

Once facts are treated as negotiable, rights become negotiable too. And if persuasion by reason is abandoned, what remains as the ultimate persuader? Force.

Condensed list of the main causes (Objectivist formulation)

Bad philosophy (subjectivism, altruism-as-duty, collectivism).
Crisis-driven pragmatism (“necessity” overriding rights).
Economic illiteracy (blaming markets for interventionist outcomes). (news.gallup.com)
Debt-state politics (buying support via redistribution/deficits). (cbo.gov)
Administrative-state expansion (power without objective law).
Polarized tribalism (each side seeks control to stop the other). (pewresearch.org)

Learn more:

In addition:

There’s more that can be added, and it helps to separate (a) underlying philosophical causes from (b) institutional/economic mechanisms that make statism grow almost automatically.

Below is an Objectivist/Peikoff-style integration, with a few up-to-date indicators (public opinion, trust, industrial policy) to anchor the discussion.

1) The deeper cause: an anti-conceptual culture that treats politics as feelings + tribal identity

When a culture stops treating reason as the means of settling disputes, it drifts toward power. “My truth,” group-standpoint thinking, and moral subjectivism make it harder to defend individual rights as absolutes. Once rights are seen as negotiable “social constructs,” the only remaining arbiter is the state’s gun (directly or indirectly).

This is why you see growing acceptance of:

censorship-by-proxy (“dangerous speech” must be suppressed),
executive “emergency” actions,
and “outcomes” politics (equalization, DEI mandates, price/industry direction).

The epistemological rot comes first; coercion is the consequence.

2) Institutional mistrust + polarization: the public becomes willing to “burn the system down” or let leaders bypass it

Trust in government has been low for a long time (and extremely partisan in who trusts it when). Pew’s tracking shows low trust levels by party and ideology. (pewresearch.org)
And Pew’s 2026 Political Typology describes a public sorted into clusters with high skepticism, high anger, and weak shared premises—conditions under which “limited government” stops being a principle and becomes a slogan used when convenient. (pewresearch.org)

Result: people are more willing to accept “rule by agency,” executive orders, selective enforcement, or “our side must control the institutions,” which is simply statism with a partisan mask.

3) Economic ignorance + a mixed economy: “capitalism” is blamed while “free enterprise” remains popular

Gallup’s polling is revealing: Americans remain very positive about “free enterprise” while being far less positive about “capitalism,” and socialism’s rating has risen (including a September 23, 2026 Gallup update noting socialism’s positive rating topping 40% for the first time in their series). (news.gallup.com)

That gap strongly suggests conceptual confusion:

People dislike “capitalism” because they associate it with cronyism, bailouts, healthcare cartels, regulatory rackets, and Wall Street–D.C. collusion (i.e., the mixed economy).
Yet they still like the idea of voluntary exchange (“free enterprise”).

From Reisman’s perspective: this confusion is fatal, because it leads the public to demand more controls to fix the damage caused by controls—an interventionist ratchet.

4) The “crisis ratchet”: emergency powers normalize permanent expansions of state control

Since the 2008 financial crisis, then COVID-era controls, and continuing “national security / supply chain” policy, the political class has trained the public to accept:

“extraordinary” spending,
ad hoc subsidies,
mandates,
and executive/agency workarounds

as normal governance. Even when a specific program ends, the precedent and machinery remain.

This is not accidental. A mixed economy breeds crises (malinvestment, distortions, brittle systems), and crises are then used to justify further power.

5) Industrial policy and subsidy capitalism: the state “directs” industries and the public calls it pragmatism

A major trend of the 2020s is the return of explicit industrial policy: government picking “strategic” sectors and subsidizing them. The CHIPS and Science Act is a flagship example; NIST describes roughly $50 billion in Commerce programs aimed at semiconductors and related goals. (nist.gov)

Whatever one thinks of the geopolitical motive, the political-economic effect is predictable:

businesses lobby for favoritism,
investment becomes politicized,
and “capitalism” increasingly means profit by pull (political pull), not profit by production.

This entrenches statism because more firms become dependent on Washington.

6) A moral shift: from rights to needs, from justice to “compassion,” from production to entitlement

Objectivism’s political base is rights (freedom from initiated force). But modern politics increasingly treats “rights” as claims on others’ labor (“healthcare is a right,” etc.). That reframes government from protector to provider—i.e., from police/courts/military to manager/distributor.

This moral shift fuels:

redistribution,
mandates,
and controls over production (“you must provide,” “you must hire,” “you must cover,” “you must fund”).

That is socialism’s essence: subordinating the producer to the nonproducer by force.

7) A psychological driver: second-handedness and the politics of resentment

A culture that morally condemns self-interest and treats wealth as suspicious will drift toward punishing achievement. In Rand’s terms, resentment at the good for being the good becomes politically packaged as “equity,” “anti-elitism,” or “anti-corporate” crusades—often while expanding government power, not freedom.

This resentment can appear on left or right; the constant is hostility to independent productive success and sympathy for coercive “corrections.”

A tighter summary (most “load-bearing” causes)

Bad epistemology (subjectivism/anti-concepts) → politics becomes power.
Crisis ratchet → emergency becomes normal governance.
Mixed economy confusion → capitalism blamed, controls demanded. (news.gallup.com)
Industrial policy/subsidy capitalism → dependence on state grows. (nist.gov)
Low trust + polarization → willingness to bypass objective law. (pewresearch.org)
Moral code of need/entitlement → rights replaced by claims.