Mr. President,
Having closely studied Thinking in Time by Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, and The March of Folly by Barbara W. Tuchman, here is an analysis and some advice on the US-Iran situation as of June 21, 2026. You have just signed the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), suspending active hostilities for a 60-day negotiating window to finalize a broader peace framework. This includes Iran reopening the Strait of Hormuz, US sanctions relief and reconstruction commitments, and deferral of core issues—particularly Iran’s nuclear program, ballistic missiles, and proxy networks—to those talks.
The moment is fragile and consequential. Iran’s military capabilities were significantly degraded by US and Israeli strikes (air superiority achieved over key areas, major nuclear and military sites hit, senior leadership including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei eliminated). Yet the regime survived under new leadership, retains substantial missile and proxy assets, and frames the MOU as US concessions rather than surrender. Global economic ripple effects from the Hormuz disruptions were real, and casualties/damage were heavy on all sides.
These two books provide a powerful lens. Thinking in Time is a practical manual for decision-makers on using history rigorously rather than rhetorically. The March of Folly diagnoses the recurring pattern of governments pursuing policies contrary to their own long-term interests despite available alternatives and internal warnings.
Core Lessons from the Books
From Thinking in Time: Policymakers inevitably draw on history via analogies, but most do it poorly—superficially, selectively, or to justify preconceptions (“procrustean” fitting). Better practice involves:
- Clarifying the present situation by distinguishing Known, Unclear, and Presumed.
- “Placement”: Putting the current problem in its full historical context (similarities and critical differences with past cases) via timelines, issue history, and journalists’ questions (who, what, when, where, why, how).
- Generating options, testing assumptions (e.g., “Alexander’s question”: What new evidence would change my mind?), and assessing likenesses/differences with analogies rather than forcing fits.
- Routine staff processes to protect against common errors like over-optimism, ignored forebodings, or bureaucratic momentum. Successes (e.g., aspects of Cuban Missile Crisis management) came from careful questioning and contextual awareness; failures often did not.
From The March of Folly: Folly is not mere error or bad luck. It is a group decision to pursue a policy contrary to the government’s self-interest, when feasible alternatives existed, despite forebodings and warnings. Classic cases:
- Trojans accepting the Greek horse (warnings ignored; “gift” hid catastrophe).
- Renaissance popes’ corruption and refusal to reform, accelerating the Reformation.
- British policies toward American colonies (coercion despite advice, leading to loss of empire).
- US escalation in Vietnam (incremental commitment despite mounting evidence of costs outweighing benefits; hubris, domestic politics, and institutional momentum overrode alternatives).
Tuchman shows these patterns recur across eras because of ambition, arrogance, emotion, groupthink, short-term political incentives, and failure to confront unpleasant realities or internal dissent.
Application to the Current Juncture
We are not in a classic “march of folly” yet, but the 60-day window carries high risk of one. The recent military campaign achieved real degradation of immediate threats (a point of strength to build on). However, history warns against two opposite traps:
- Trojan Horse risk: Accepting (or offering) a deal that provides short-term relief—sanctions easing, trade reopening, reconstruction funds, political breathing room for Tehran—while allowing Iran to reconstitute its nuclear breakout capacity, missile programs, or proxy networks over time. Past deals (including JCPOA critiques) showed verification and enforcement challenges; Iranian resilience after leadership losses has historical precedent.
- Vietnam-style trap: Sunk costs (lives, treasure, political capital from the strikes and blockade) creating pressure to “close the deal” on suboptimal terms just to declare victory or avoid further entanglement, or conversely, drifting into renewed escalation without clear, achievable objectives. Momentum and victory euphoria can crowd out rigorous analysis of second- and third-order effects (regional stability, ally cohesion, US domestic support, global energy markets, adversary learning by China/Russia/North Korea).
Known (relatively high confidence): Iran’s conventional military and some nuclear infrastructure took serious hits; Hormuz access is economically vital for all parties; the regime adapted quickly with a new supreme leader; proxies (Hezbollah, Houthis, etc.) remain factors but were strained.
Unclear: Exact post-strike status of highly enriched uranium (HEU) stockpiles and weaponization-related work; cohesion and intentions of the new Iranian leadership (pragmatic survival vs. ideological revanche); durability of any verification regime; Israel’s tolerance for specific terms; long-term Iranian ability/willingness to rebuild covertly.
Presumed (test these rigorously): Iran will seek to maximize concessions while minimizing irreversible concessions on its nuclear threshold and regional influence; hardliners retain significant power; US public and congressional appetite for prolonged confrontation is limited.
Analogies must be stress-tested for differences. This is not 1945 Japan (no occupation or total surrender). It is not classic Vietnam (air-dominant campaign achieved objectives faster, no US ground quagmire yet). It has echoes of post-Soleimani dynamics or the 2025 Twelve-Day War but on a larger scale. Placement in the longer arc (1979 Revolution → Iran-Iraq War resilience → nuclear program history → proxy evolution → JCPOA → maximum pressure → recent escalation) reveals both Iranian adaptability and recurring US challenges with verification and enforcement.
Recommended Course of Action for the Next 60 Days and Beyond
1. Institutionalize rigorous historical thinking right now (Thinking in Time discipline).
Convene a structured interagency process (NSC-led, with State, Defense, Intelligence, Treasury, and external historians/regional experts, perhaps bipartisan congressional input). Require explicit:
- Known/Unclear/Presumed mapping for the nuclear file, missiles, proxies, and Iranian internal dynamics.
- Timelines of the nuclear program, proxy evolution, and past negotiations.
- Placement exercise: How does the current Iranian regime (post-Khamenei) compare to previous iterations? What are likenesses/differences with past US-Iran deals or post-conflict moments?
- Analogy audit: For every proposed deal element or alternative, list strongest historical parallels and why they differ here.
- Options generation with explicit bets/odds on compliance, cheating, or escalation scenarios, plus triggers for adjustment.
This is not academic—it is protective against the very mistakes Neustadt and May documented.
2. Define non-negotiable US interests for any final deal and negotiate from the position of recent military success, not haste.
Core objective: Prevent a nuclear-armed Iran (or one at breakout threshold) while reducing (not necessarily eliminating overnight) proxy threats and securing Hormuz stability. Secondary: Support for Israel and Gulf partners, manageable economic burden on the US, and avoidance of open-ended entanglement.
In the 60-day window, push for:
- Verifiable, time-bound steps on the nuclear program (full HEU stockpile accounting/dilution/destruction under enhanced IAEA access with strong snapback mechanisms superior to JCPOA weaknesses; low enrichment caps; constraints on weaponization-related activities).
- Concrete, monitorable limits or transparency on ballistic missiles (production, ranges, exports).
- Measurable reductions in proxy support (funding, arms flows to Hezbollah, Houthis, Hamas, etc.), with enforcement mechanisms.
- Phased, reversible sanctions relief and any reconstruction support tied strictly to milestones and verification—not front-loaded promises.
Avoid both extremes: an overly generous “peace at any price” that revives the threat, or maximalist demands that make no deal possible and risk renewed fighting without clear victory conditions. History (Vietnam, British colonies) shows that policies ignoring the other side’s minimal interests or internal constraints often backfire.
3. Explicitly guard against March of Folly dynamics.
- Treat this as a group decision. Actively solicit and weigh dissenting views (from intelligence analysts, allies like Israel and Gulf states, congressional leaders). Do not let “we just won” momentum or desire for a signature achievement override evidence.
- Build in automaticity and consequences: Strong verification, rapid-response options if cheating is detected (targeted strikes on reconstitution efforts, secondary sanctions, etc.), rather than relying on goodwill.
- Prepare credible Plan B now: If Iran stalls, offers unverifiable promises, or tests limits, be ready to resume calibrated pressure (military, economic, diplomatic) without drifting into quagmire or overreach. Avoid the incremental-commitment trap.
- Do not ignore forebodings from history or current intelligence about Iranian regime behavior and resilience.
4. Broader strategic moves that align with the books’ insights.
- Strengthen the coalition: Use any deal to lock in and expand Abraham Accords-style normalization and Gulf security cooperation. Isolated US action is weaker.
- Domestic durability: Engage Congress early on enforcement mechanisms so any agreement has broader buy-in and survives administrations.
- Communicate with clarity and discipline: Red lines firm, incentives real, but no over-promising quick transformation of Iranian behavior.
- Long-term risk reduction: Accelerate efforts to reduce global dependence on Hormuz (energy diversification, alternative routes) and harden defenses against missiles/proxies.
Bottom line: The recent military phase created leverage. The 60-day window is an opportunity to convert that into durable constraint on Iran’s most dangerous capabilities—or to set conditions for renewed pressure if Tehran will not agree to terms that genuinely serve US interests. History, as these books show, punishes both wishful thinking and rigid ideology more often than it rewards either. It rewards leaders and processes that clarify reality, test assumptions rigorously, generate real alternatives, and resist the seductive pull of policies that feel good in the moment but undermine long-term security.
You have tools and advisors. Insist on the disciplined use of history that Neustadt and May advocated, and consciously reject the patterns Tuchman documented. The result can be a stronger position than either unchecked escalation or an illusory quick fix.
This is offered in the spirit of those works—as practical counsel for better decision-making at a critical juncture. The choice of path remains yours and your team’s.
In addition:
"You close it and you won't have a country." President Trump said he told Iranian officials about the Strait of Hormuz. "You won't even make it back to your fu*king country." "We may take over the Strait, if we have to," Trump said. "If they don't make a deal, we'll collect tolls." Trump added the U.S. could become the "Guardian Angel" of the Strait, and take 20% of the oil."
No, President Trump should not pursue or emphasize this approach as a primary public stance or policy threat at this juncture.
The recent MOU already addressed the Strait of Hormuz reopening as part of the ceasefire framework, with the 60-day window focused on finalizing nuclear, missile, and proxy issues. Re-escalating rhetoric around US takeover, toll collection, or claiming 20% of the oil risks undermining the fragile momentum and repeating patterns warned against in both books you referenced earlier.
Why It Risks Folly (March of Folly Lens)
Tuchman defines folly as policies contrary to self-interest, pursued by groups despite alternatives and warnings. This idea carries several red flags:
- Economic self-harm: Disrupting or "tolling" the Strait (through which ~20% of global oil passes) would spike prices, hurt US consumers/economy, allies (Europe, Asia), and Gulf partners. Recent war disruptions already showed the pain—repeating it voluntarily invites broader costs without clear victory.
- International backlash and isolation: Framing the US as "Guardian Angel" taking a cut sounds like resource seizure. It hands Iran/China/Russia a propaganda win ("imperialist aggression"), strains relations with Gulf states and Europe, and invites legal/diplomatic challenges (UNCLOS, etc.). History's British colonial policies and Vietnam escalation show how coercive overreach alienates supporters and entrenches opponents.
- Escalation trap: Threats like "you won't have a country" or takeover could provoke Iranian hardliners, proxy attacks, or mine-laying, restarting hostilities when the military campaign already achieved significant degradation. Alternatives (phased diplomacy + targeted pressure) exist.
- Groupthink/victory disease risk: Post-strikes euphoria can lead to overreach, ignoring forebodings from intel on Iranian resilience or domestic US war fatigue.
This isn't the Trojan Horse exactly, but it risks turning a position of strength into a self-inflicted wound.
Why It Undermines Better Decision-Making (Thinking in Time Lens)
Neustadt and May stress clarifying Known/Unclear/Presumed, careful placement in historical context, and testing analogies/options before acting:
- Known: The MOU gave leverage—Hormuz reopened, Iran damaged. US naval/air power can deter closure without overt seizure.
- Unclear/Presumed (needs rigorous staff work): Feasibility of sustained "tolls" or control (logistics, blowback, enforcement costs); Iranian response (asymmetric retaliation likely); ally support (low for unilateral grab); long-term precedent (encourages others to seize chokepoints).
- Historical placement: Analogies to past Hormuz tensions (1980s Tanker War—US escorted but didn't seize), post-war occupations, or resource grabs often lead to quagmires or isolation, with differences here (no full occupation, nuclear shadow, global energy markets more integrated). Superficial "we won, so we own it" risks poor outcomes like Vietnam's incremental traps.
Better process: Use timelines of Hormuz incidents, journalist questions on stakeholders, and options analysis (diplomatic guarantees, multilateral monitoring, credible but quiet deterrent presence) before public threats.
Recommended Path Instead
- Leverage quietly and credibly: Maintain strong naval presence and public red lines on closure without announcing takeover/tolls. Signal that any Iranian interference triggers swift, targeted response (as you did effectively before).
- Tie to the 60-day talks: Condition sanctions relief/reconstruction on verifiable steps, including permanent, monitored openness of the Strait (perhaps with international partners). Economic incentives for Iran (trade access) work better than extraction threats if compliance is the goal.
- Multilateral framing: Position the US as guarantor of free navigation (with allies), not toll collector. This aligns with long-term interests (stable energy markets, alliances) and avoids folly.
- Contingencies: Prepare enforcement options, but default to calibrated pressure over grand seizure. Test assumptions internally: What evidence would show this rhetoric is helping vs. hurting the final deal?
Your maximum-pressure track record and recent strikes give real leverage—don't squander it on rhetoric that could rally Iranian nationalists or complicate the nuclear/proxy endgame. History favors disciplined strength over dramatic overreach here. Focus on a durable deal that prevents Iranian breakout while minimizing US costs and risks. If talks fail, targeted actions beat broad confrontation.
Finally:
[Vice President JD Vance declared that the Trump administration’s goal is to “transform our relationship” with Iran during his opening remarks in Switzerland at Sunday’s meeting with top negotiators from Tehran.
Vance stressed that in order to do this, Washington needs ironclad commitments from the Islamic Republic to give up its aspirations of obtaining a nuclear weapon — something Tehran has long claimed it isn’t pursuing.
“What the president has asked us to do is turn over a new leaf to transform our relationship with the people of Iran, and to extend an outstretched hand that says to the people of Iran that if your leadership is willing to give up being a driver of regional instability,” “If they are willing to give up nuclear weapons ambitions for the long term, then the United States is willing to fundamentally transform our relationship with that country,” he went on. “That is certainly our goal.”]
Response to VP Vance’s Statement (Integrated Lessons from Four Books)
Vice President Vance’s remarks in Switzerland today frame the ongoing 60-day negotiations as an opportunity for a “new leaf” and “fundamental transformation” of US-Iran relations: an outstretched hand to the Iranian people if their leadership abandons nuclear weapons ambitions and its role as a driver of regional instability (proxies, Hezbollah, Houthis, etc.). This comes amid the fragile post-MOU ceasefire, with focus on nuclear verification, Lebanon, and Hormuz stability.
Drawing rigorously from Thinking in Time (Neustadt & May), The March of Folly (Tuchman), The Lessons of History (Will & Ariel Durant), and Historians’ Fallacies (David Hackett Fischer), this is a high-stakes pivot worth pursuing conditionally and skeptically—not as ideological optimism or inevitable progress. The books together warn against wishful narratives of transformation while offering tools for clearer-eyed statecraft.
Key Integrated Insights
Human Nature and Recurring Patterns (Lessons of History + Constant Human Drives): The Durants emphasize that human nature changes slowly (“with geological leisureliness”). Competition, selection, inequality, and the biological imperatives (life must breed, compete, and organize for survival) shape civilizations more than fleeting ideals. Moral codes serve social cohesion; religion and ideology endure; war is the norm, peace the exception; economics and geography (e.g., Hormuz chokepoint, Iran’s strategic position) drive behavior. Regimes like Iran’s theocratic one are products of these forces—survival-oriented, hierarchical, and adaptive. “Transformation” assumes malleability that history rarely delivers without overwhelming leverage or internal collapse. Expect Iranian leadership to prioritize regime preservation and regional influence over fundamental change.
Avoid Folly and Self-Defeating Persistence (March of Folly): Tuchman documents policies contrary to self-interest despite alternatives and warnings (Trojans’ horse, Vietnam escalation, British colonial coercion). Vance’s “outstretched hand” risks folly if it becomes unconditional aid/sanctions relief without ironclad, verifiable curbs on enrichment, missiles, and proxies. Past deals unraveled amid Iranian non-compliance; offering “transformation” without enforcement mechanisms repeats the pattern of ignoring forebodings for short-term de-escalation optics. Group decisions (administration, Congress, allies) must resist bureaucratic momentum or victory euphoria post-strikes.
Rigorous Historical Thinking, Not Superficial Analogies (Thinking in Time): Neustadt and May demand “placement” (contextual timelines, Known/Unclear/Presumed distinctions) and careful analogy use.
- Known: Iran’s military degraded; regime resilient post-leadership losses; nuclear program long pursued despite denials.
- Unclear: New leadership’s (post-Khamenei) internal factions and true compliance intent; verification robustness.
- Presumed (test rigorously): Iran will play for time to rebuild, per historical pattern.
Avoid “historian’s fallacy” (Fischer) or assuming Iranian actors see the world as we do today. Place this against JCPOA flaws, proxy evolution, and post-war settlements. Generate options with consequences: phased relief tied to milestones beats blanket transformation promises.
Guard Against Reasoning Fallacies (Historians’ Fallacies): Fischer catalogs errors like post hoc (assuming strikes “caused” Iranian reasonableness), single-cause explanations (nuclear as the only issue), genetic fallacy (dismissing Iranian overtures due to regime origins), false dichotomies (transform or bomb), and metaphysical questions (“inevitable” reform?). Negotiators must demand precise, testable evidence—not narratives of “new leaf” or inevitability. Iran’s claims of peaceful nuclear intent require extraordinary verification, not trust.
Balanced Assessment and Advice
Vance’s framing is diplomatically astute in tone—signaling to the Iranian people separates them from hardliners, aligns with deal-making leverage from recent strikes, and keeps the 60-day window constructive. High-level engagement (rare since 1979) can clarify intentions and test red lines. It avoids immediate folly of renewed war.
However, history cautions realism over transformation optimism:
- Durants: Expect competition and selection—regime elites will maneuver for advantage. Inequality and power structures persist; external “outstretched hands” rarely override internal biological/social imperatives without sustained pressure.
- Combined risks: Over-reliance on diplomacy could march into folly if it revives Iran’s capabilities (nuclear threshold, proxies) without dismantling drivers of instability. Economic incentives (reconstruction) must be conditional, or they fuel the very competition the regime excels at.
- Fischer/Neustadt-May: Structure talks with explicit Known/Unclear mapping, timelines of Iranian behavior, and fallacy-proof metrics (e.g., IAEA access, proxy funding audits, missile limits). Avoid assuming past actors (or current Iranian negotiators) share US perspectives on “transformation.”
Recommended Refinements for Success:
- Ironclad Verification First: Make “transformation” explicitly contingent on irreversible steps (HEU dilution/removal, enrichment caps, proxy defunding with monitoring). Snapback sanctions stronger than JCPOA. This aligns with all four books’ emphasis on evidence over hope.
- Multilateral and Phased: Involve Israel, Gulf states, and others for durability. Phase relief/economic openings to milestones—avoids single-cause or post hoc errors.
- Realistic Objectives: Aim for containment and reduced threat (non-nuclear Iran, less proxy aggression, open Hormuz) rather than wholesale relationship overhaul. Durants remind us civilizations change gradually; human nature endures.
- Contingencies and Placement: Prepare targeted pressure options if talks stall. Use full historical placement: This moment resembles post-crisis negotiations where leverage fades without enforcement. Test assumptions publicly and internally.
- Domestic/Alliance Buy-In: Ensure congressional and ally alignment to avoid future reversals or isolation (folly risk).
In sum, Vance’s outreach is a viable tool if subordinated to rigorous, history-informed realism. The four books converge on humility: Progress is possible but rare without confronting unchanging human patterns, avoiding self-defeating persistence, reasoning precisely, and using context over comforting narratives. Pursue the “new leaf” with open eyes and strong guardrails—transformation rhetoric should describe outcomes, not substitute for them. This approach maximizes prospects for durable US advantage without repeating history’s costliest errors.