Monday, September 28, 2026

Systemantics: what is causing the trend away from freedom to statism in the US?

 

Here is a drawing ( parties as arrows instead of dots) showing that the recent trend of the political spectrum in the US is to move away from limited government, freedom, and capitalism toward statism, force, and socialism.





How to read the arrows:

  • Head = recent practice. Shaft = where that coalition came from.
  • Democrats: into the administrative band (more center, more mandate).
  • GOP establishment: same band, different color — security and industrial management.
  • MAGA: out of the oval toward national levers; rhetoric still talks back toward federalism.
  • A small teal remnant still points at the oval. That is the SPOTM political target, not a current majority.
This trend is very disturbing. What are the causes of it? What laws are involved in this trend?


From a systemantics perspective

 The arrows move the way described when crises, coalitions, and complex systems all have one-direction ratchets. The “laws” below—mostly stylized regularities from political economy, organization theory, and the system fiasco canon—explain why expansion is easier than rollback.

Crisis and permanence

  • Higgs’s Ratchet Effect: emergencies expand state power; peacetime rollbacks are partial, so size/authority stair-step upward.
  • Friedman’s Law of Temporary Programs: nothing is so permanent as a temporary government program; sunsets rarely set.
  • Precautionary/Regulatory Ratchet: once a risk is publicly named, regulation only tightens; deregulatory moves face asymmetric blame.

Coalitions and incentives

  • Olson’s Logic of Collective Action: concentrated beneficiaries out-lobby diffuse taxpayers; addition beats subtraction.
  • Stigler’s Capture: regulators drift toward the interests they regulate; rules accrete around incumbents.
  • Pournelle’s Iron Law of Bureaucracy: those loyal to the organization’s survival outcompete those loyal to its mission; expansion is the safe career bet.
  • Iron Triangle Dynamic: agencies, committees, and client groups reinforce each other’s budgets and mandates.

Elections and demographics

  • Wagner’s Law: as incomes rise and societies age/urbanize, demand for public services and transfers rises.
  • Median Voter Theorem: parties converge toward where 50%+1 lives; if the median wants more insurance/services, platforms migrate that way.
  • Path Dependence/Increasing Returns (North/Arthur): once programs create networks/expectations, exit costs grow; lock-in.

Measurement, ideas, and attention

  • Goodhart’s/Campbell’s Law: when a metric becomes a target, it gets gamed; fixes require new layers, not fewer.
  • Law of Unintended Consequences (Cobra Effect): interventions produce side-effects that justify further interventions.
  • Availability/Present Bias: voters and politicians overweight immediate, seen benefits vs. diffuse, delayed costs; “print and mandate” wins news cycles.

Complex systems behavior (Systemantics/Murphy)

  • Gall/Systemantics: complex systems that work evolved from simpler ones; bolt‑ons degrade reliability and demand more bolt‑ons.
  • Function Creep Law: a system given one task will find others; mission expands to fit capacity (and then expands capacity).
  • Murphy’s Law (with Finagle’s corollary): what can go wrong will—especially at interfaces; failures prompt safeguards that add complexity, not simplicity.

Engineering-style cost laws (Augustine)

  • Augustine’s Curve: the last 10% of performance costs most of the money and creates most of the problems; political “gold-plating” drives cost/complexity upward.
  • Schedule/Scope Creep Law: to meet dates, add resources; added coordination makes you later; slippage begets oversight begets slippage.
  • “Cheaper is expensive” dynamic: cutting corners up front raises lifecycle costs; programs justify larger permanent support tails.

How these map to your diagnosis

  • Crisis ratchet + interest groups are the motor (Higgs, Olson, Pournelle, Stigler, Friedman).
  • Ideas/metrics tilt the field (Goodhart/Campbell, precautionary ratchet), rewarding visible action over invisible restraint.
  • Demographic and coalition shifts move the median (Wagner, Median Voter, path dependence), shaping which expansions are politically safest.
  • Short-horizon culture and media incentives amplify all of the above (present bias/availability), making “say yes now, sort it out later” the dominant strategy.
  • Once built, the administrative system behaves like any large system (Systemantics/Murphy/Augustine): self-preserving, complexity‑seeking, rollback‑resistant.

Corollaries if you want the arrows to bend back

  • Make “temporary” real: hard sunsets with default-off and supermajority renewals counter Higgs/Friedman.
  • Change who is organized: fund broad, rule‑level constituencies (taxpayer/consumer) to offset Olson’s asymmetry.
  • Design for simplicity first: small, general rules beat bespoke programs (Gall); cap interfaces and metrics to avoid Goodhart spirals.
  • Build off-ramps: automatic de-escalators tied to outcomes reduce precautionary and capture ratchets.
  • Pay lifecycle costs up front: force cost/benefit and maintenance budgeting early (Augustine), or complexity wins by default.

Systemantics and Murphy say systems drift toward maximum complication; Augustine says the bill for that drift arrives late and large. Public-choice laws say organized winners will gladly pay it with someone else’s wallet. Put together, that’s why—absent deliberate counter-ratchets—the arrows tend to move away from limited government and toward thicker, more force-capable centers.


In addition:


Here’s a deeper cut you can use as a map and a checklist. In Murphy/Systemantics/Augustine fashion: systems drift toward maximal complication, failures justify safeguards, and the last 10% of “fix” costs 90% of the money.

More “laws” and regularities that fit your trend

  • Fiscal Illusion (Puviani/Buchanan): when costs are hidden (withholding, deficits, tax expenditures), voters demand more than they’d buy at visible prices.
  • Flypaper Effect: intergovernmental grants “stick” where they hit; federal money ratchets state/local scope up rather than replacing local funds.
  • Baumol’s Cost Disease: government-heavy sectors (education, health, safety) get relatively pricier over time even if productivity stalls—budget share rises.
  • Second-Best Theorem: with many distortions, removing one can make things worse—politics responds with layers, not subtractions.
  • Issue-Attention Cycle (Downs): bursts of attention reward visible action; the maintenance phase is invisible—so add now, forget later.
  • Kingdon’s Multiple Streams + Policy Entrepreneurship: problems, politics, and ready-made policy menus meet at “windows” (usually crises), then lock in.
  • Punctuated Equilibrium (Baumgartner/Jones): long stasis, short bursts of large change—almost always additive.
  • Niskanen’s Budget-Maximizing Bureaucrat: career safety tracks budget/mandate growth; shrinking is hazardous duty.
  • Shirky Principle: institutions preserve the problem they were created to solve.
  • Peltzman Effect: safety nets can raise risk-taking; follow-on regulation responds to the new risk—another layer.
  • Parkinson’s Law (and bikeshedding): work expands to fill the budget, and debate fixates on tractable minutiae—complexity without priority.
  • Brandolini’s Asymmetry: it takes 10× effort to refute bad ideas; regulation fights rumors faster than it sunsets rules.
  • Path Dependence/Lock-in: beneficiaries, vendor ecosystems, and compliance capital make reversal costly even when consensus shifts.

Mechanism sketch: how arrows move in practice

  1. Shock or salience spike: crisis, scandal, or moral panic. Murphy’s corollary: the interface you didn’t test fails first.
  2. Window opens: policy entrepreneurs push shelf-ready ideas (Kingdon). Prebuilt toolkits beat abstract restraint.
  3. Coalition assembles: concentrated winners (Olson) out-organize diffuse payers; narratives frame action as precaution.
  4. Layering not pruning: to avoid blame (regulator risk aversion), add a program or mandate; few dare to remove legacy parts (Systemantics).
  5. Lock-in: budgets, grants, compliance systems, and court precedents create exit costs; metrics get gamed (Goodhart), prompting new metrics.
  6. Drift and expansion: mission creep + function creep; “temporary” becomes platform (Friedman’s law). Augustine’s curve: the tail support costs take over.

How to diagnose the ratchet in your own data

  • Scope and complexity
    • Pages/constraints in the Code of Federal Regulations; count of “major” rules per year; average length of statutes/appropriations.
    • Active national emergency declarations and their duration.
  • Fiscal footprint
    • Federal outlays and transfers as % of GDP; beneficiaries as a % of population; tax-expenditure totals (hidden spending).
    • Federal grants to states per capita; the “stickiness” of grants after the originating crisis ends.
  • Administrative mass
    • Full-time equivalents in agencies tied to recent crises; contractor counts; compliance hours reported by OMB.
  • Political demand
    • Survey medians on risk, redistribution, and “government do more vs. less” by age, education, sex, and metro density.
    • Turnout-weighted medians (who votes, not just who’s eligible).

Counter‑ratchets that have actually worked at least once

  • All‑or‑nothing fast tracks: package downsizing (e.g., base-closure style commissions) with no amendments and guaranteed vote; reduces Olson’s veto points.
  • Hard sunsets with default-off: renewal requires supermajority and a fresh cost–benefit; tie funding and authority to measured outcomes.
  • Regulatory budgets: one‑in‑X‑out or net‑burden caps at the rulebook level; forces trade-offs across agencies.
  • Grant design with off‑ramps: match requirements that rise over time and automatic phase-downs once indicators normalize.
  • Broad rules over bespoke programs: generality beats kludges (Systemantics: start simple or you’ll never get simple).
  • Independent scorekeeping + transparency: visible lifecycle costs blunt fiscal illusion; precommit the maintenance tail before launch.
  • “Losers-first” compensation: fund transition packages up front to dissolve concentrated opposition to repeal.

Why demographics and culture matter but don’t “decide”

  • Wagner’s and Baumol’s pressures raise baseline demand for social insurance as societies age and urbanize; the gender gap, education sorting, and metro density shift the median voter toward risk-buffering.
  • Media/attention economics compress time horizons; present bias rewards immediate visible benefits over diffuse, delayed costs—politically, addition dominates subtraction.
  • But ideas and design still bite: simple, general institutions with clean exits can resist the drift even with the same electorate.
==========================================================================

From a philosophical point of view 

Several things are happening in the U.S. (especially since the late 2000s and accelerating through the 2010s–mid‑2020s) that push politics away from freedom, limited government, and capitalism and toward statism, coercion, and “soft” forms of socialism. From an Objectivist standpoint, the root is philosophical—bad ideas about reason, rights, and economics—but you can name the main proximate causes clearly.

Below are the major drivers, integrated into a coherent explanation.

1) A long-running collapse of trust, producing demand for “someone to take control”

When people believe society is chaotic, corrupt, or unintelligible, they become receptive to the idea that power (not principle) is the solution. Pew data show trust in the federal government remains very low compared with historical levels. (pewresearch.org)

Low trust does not automatically create liberty. More often it produces:

  • cynical factionalism (“our strongman vs. their strongman”),
  • acceptance of emergency powers,
  • and a view of politics as tribal warfare rather than principled government under objective law.

2) Crisis politics: “emergency” becomes the normal justification for coercion

The modern pattern is: crisis → “do something now” → executive/agency power expands → it never fully contracts.

The U.S. has had a sequence of major crises—financial, pandemic, supply-chain, geopolitical, etc.—and each becomes an excuse for controls, subsidies, mandates, censorship-by-proxy, industrial policy, and deficit spending. Once the public accepts “necessity has no law,” limited government is functionally dead.

3) Intellectual drift: capitalism is blamed for problems caused by mixed economy and controls

Public opinion data show capitalism’s reputation has weakened while socialism’s has improved, especially among some groups; e.g., Gallup reports capitalism favorability lower than earlier years and socialism rising (though “free enterprise” remains very popular—indicating confusion about terms). (news.gallup.com)

Objectivist diagnosis: people experience real problems (housing costs, healthcare dysfunction, credential inflation, regulatory cartels, bailouts, cronyism), and then misidentify the cause as “capitalism,” when much of it is the product of a long-standing mixed economy—government intervention plus politically connected business.

That misidentification fuels the demand for more intervention, which worsens the cycle.

4) Debt, deficits, and the political bribery of “something for nothing”

Massive ongoing deficits normalize the premise that:

  • you can consume without producing,
  • rights become “entitlements to goods,”
  • and the state can print/borrow prosperity into existence.

CBO projections have documented very large deficits and rising debt dynamics driven heavily by mandatory spending and interest costs. (cbo.gov)

In Reisman’s terms (economics): deficit finance and redistribution are not “compassion”—they are methods of transferring wealth and distorting capital formation, undermining long-run productivity while politically buying votes in the short run.

5) Growth of the administrative state: rule by agencies replaces rule by objective law

Even when Congress is gridlocked, government power expands through:

  • agency rulemaking,
  • enforcement discretion,
  • “guidance” documents,
  • and executive actions.

This is statism by structure: it bypasses objective, knowable, stable law—the political requirement of rights—and replaces it with managerial decree. The result is a culture where businesses and individuals increasingly must ask permission.

6) Tribal polarization makes force feel “necessary”

When politics becomes an all-out moral war, each side comes to see the other as an existential threat. That produces a predictable effect: willingness to use state power to crush opponents—regulations, deplatforming, selective prosecutions, weaponized investigations, etc.

This is the psychology of statism: if you believe your enemies are monsters, you will accept coercion “just this once.” Then it’s never “once.”

7) Cultural subjectivism: feelings replace facts; “my narrative” replaces reality

Objectivism holds that reason is man’s means of knowledge. But much of modern culture treats knowledge as:

  • group “standpoints,”
  • power narratives,
  • or subjective “lived experience.”

Once facts are treated as negotiable, rights become negotiable too. And if persuasion by reason is abandoned, what remains as the ultimate persuader? Force.

Condensed list of the main causes (Objectivist formulation)

  1. Bad philosophy (subjectivism, altruism-as-duty, collectivism).
  2. Crisis-driven pragmatism (“necessity” overriding rights).
  3. Economic illiteracy (blaming markets for interventionist outcomes). (news.gallup.com)
  4. Debt-state politics (buying support via redistribution/deficits). (cbo.gov)
  5. Administrative-state expansion (power without objective law).
  6. Polarized tribalism (each side seeks control to stop the other). (pewresearch.org)



Learn more:

  1. Public Trust in Government: 1958-2025 | Pew Research Center
  2. Image of Capitalism Slips to 54% in U.S.
  3. An Update to the Budget and Economic Outlook: 2024 to 2034 | Congressional Budget Office
  4. How Americans View Capitalism, Socialism and Free Enterprise
  5. Americans’ feelings about federal government grow more polarized as Democrats’ anger spikes | Pew Research Center


In addition:

There’s more that can be added, and it helps to separate (a) underlying philosophical causes from (b) institutional/economic mechanisms that make statism grow almost automatically.

Below is an Objectivist/Peikoff-style integration, with a few up-to-date indicators (public opinion, trust, industrial policy) to anchor the discussion.

1) The deeper cause: an anti-conceptual culture that treats politics as feelings + tribal identity

When a culture stops treating reason as the means of settling disputes, it drifts toward power. “My truth,” group-standpoint thinking, and moral subjectivism make it harder to defend individual rights as absolutes. Once rights are seen as negotiable “social constructs,” the only remaining arbiter is the state’s gun (directly or indirectly).

This is why you see growing acceptance of:

  • censorship-by-proxy (“dangerous speech” must be suppressed),
  • executive “emergency” actions,
  • and “outcomes” politics (equalization, DEI mandates, price/industry direction).

The epistemological rot comes first; coercion is the consequence.

2) Institutional mistrust + polarization: the public becomes willing to “burn the system down” or let leaders bypass it

Trust in government has been low for a long time (and extremely partisan in who trusts it when). Pew’s tracking shows low trust levels by party and ideology. (pewresearch.org)
And Pew’s 2026 Political Typology describes a public sorted into clusters with high skepticism, high anger, and weak shared premises—conditions under which “limited government” stops being a principle and becomes a slogan used when convenient. (pewresearch.org)

Result: people are more willing to accept “rule by agency,” executive orders, selective enforcement, or “our side must control the institutions,” which is simply statism with a partisan mask.

3) Economic ignorance + a mixed economy: “capitalism” is blamed while “free enterprise” remains popular

Gallup’s polling is revealing: Americans remain very positive about “free enterprise” while being far less positive about “capitalism,” and socialism’s rating has risen (including a September 23, 2026 Gallup update noting socialism’s positive rating topping 40% for the first time in their series). (news.gallup.com)

That gap strongly suggests conceptual confusion:

  • People dislike “capitalism” because they associate it with cronyism, bailouts, healthcare cartels, regulatory rackets, and Wall Street–D.C. collusion (i.e., the mixed economy).
  • Yet they still like the idea of voluntary exchange (“free enterprise”).

From Reisman’s perspective: this confusion is fatal, because it leads the public to demand more controls to fix the damage caused by controls—an interventionist ratchet.

4) The “crisis ratchet”: emergency powers normalize permanent expansions of state control

Since the 2008 financial crisis, then COVID-era controls, and continuing “national security / supply chain” policy, the political class has trained the public to accept:

  • “extraordinary” spending,
  • ad hoc subsidies,
  • mandates,
  • and executive/agency workarounds

as normal governance. Even when a specific program ends, the precedent and machinery remain.

This is not accidental. A mixed economy breeds crises (malinvestment, distortions, brittle systems), and crises are then used to justify further power.

5) Industrial policy and subsidy capitalism: the state “directs” industries and the public calls it pragmatism

A major trend of the 2020s is the return of explicit industrial policy: government picking “strategic” sectors and subsidizing them. The CHIPS and Science Act is a flagship example; NIST describes roughly $50 billion in Commerce programs aimed at semiconductors and related goals. (nist.gov)

Whatever one thinks of the geopolitical motive, the political-economic effect is predictable:

  • businesses lobby for favoritism,
  • investment becomes politicized,
  • and “capitalism” increasingly means profit by pull (political pull), not profit by production.

This entrenches statism because more firms become dependent on Washington.

6) A moral shift: from rights to needs, from justice to “compassion,” from production to entitlement

Objectivism’s political base is rights (freedom from initiated force). But modern politics increasingly treats “rights” as claims on others’ labor (“healthcare is a right,” etc.). That reframes government from protector to provider—i.e., from police/courts/military to manager/distributor.

This moral shift fuels:

  • redistribution,
  • mandates,
  • and controls over production (“you must provide,” “you must hire,” “you must cover,” “you must fund”).

That is socialism’s essence: subordinating the producer to the nonproducer by force.

7) A psychological driver: second-handedness and the politics of resentment

A culture that morally condemns self-interest and treats wealth as suspicious will drift toward punishing achievement. In Rand’s terms, resentment at the good for being the good becomes politically packaged as “equity,” “anti-elitism,” or “anti-corporate” crusades—often while expanding government power, not freedom.

This resentment can appear on left or right; the constant is hostility to independent productive success and sympathy for coercive “corrections.”


A tighter summary (most “load-bearing” causes)

  1. Bad epistemology (subjectivism/anti-concepts) → politics becomes power.
  2. Crisis ratchet → emergency becomes normal governance.
  3. Mixed economy confusion → capitalism blamed, controls demanded. (news.gallup.com)
  4. Industrial policy/subsidy capitalism → dependence on state grows. (nist.gov)
  5. Low trust + polarization → willingness to bypass objective law. (pewresearch.org)
  6. Moral code of need/entitlement → rights replaced by claims.

Learn more:

  1. Trust in government by party and ideology | Pew Research Center
  2. Beyond Red vs. Blue: The 2026 Political Typology | Pew Research Center
  3. How Americans View Capitalism, Socialism and Free Enterprise
  4. CHIPS FOR AMERICA | NIST

Sunday, September 27, 2026

mohammedanism, sharia law and the Constitution of the US

 

mohammedanism, sharia law and the Constitution of the US

  • No religion is “unconstitutional” in the United States. Mohammedanism is protected like any other faith. The government may not adopt religious law (including “Sharia”) as civil law, but individuals remain free to believe, worship, and privately order some affairs consistent with mohammedan principles, so long as they comply with neutral, generally applicable laws. (constitution.congress.gov)

U.S. Constitution provisions most directly related

  • First Amendment (Religion Clauses): “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” These clauses both bar government from establishing a religion and protect voluntary religious practice. Applied to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. (constitution.congress.gov)
  • Fourteenth Amendment (Due Process/Equal Protection): Incorporates the First Amendment against state and local governments; also forbids government from selectively burdening a faith. (law.cornell.edu)
  • Article VI, Clause 3 (No Religious Test): “No religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.” Government may not bar Muslims (or anyone else) from office. (constitution.congress.gov)

How courts have applied these principles to Islam and to “religious law”

  1. Government may not target a particular religion or single out “Sharia”
  • Laws that aim at a religion fail strict scrutiny. The Supreme Court struck down city ordinances targeting SanterĂ­a; the rule is that government cannot suppress religious exercise through targeting. Courts have applied the same principle when states singled out “Sharia.” The Tenth Circuit invalidated Oklahoma’s “Save Our State” amendment that forbade courts from “considering or using Sharia law,” because it singled out one faith. (supreme.justia.com)
  1. Government may not “establish” religious law as civil law
  • The Establishment Clause bars adopting religious law as such. At the same time, secular laws may overlap with religious morality if they serve a secular purpose (e.g., Sunday-closing cases). (constitution.congress.gov)
  1. Individuals are broadly free to practice Islam, subject to neutral laws of general applicability
  • The Free Exercise Clause protects belief and many forms of practice. But religious belief does not excuse violations of neutral criminal or civil laws (the “belief–action” distinction and the “neutral and generally applicable” rule). Classic examples: the Court upheld polygamy bans despite a religious defense; more generally, religious objections do not override neutral prohibitions. (supreme.justia.com)
  • Some harmful practices sometimes associated by the public with “religious law” are illegal regardless of faith (e.g., female genital mutilation of minors under 18 U.S.C. § 116). Religious motivation provides no defense. (law.cornell.edu)
  • A New Jersey appellate court reversed a trial judge who excused assault/sexual assault based on the defendant’s claimed religious beliefs, emphasizing that religion cannot negate criminal intent. (law.justia.com)
  1. Robust protections and accommodations for Islamic practice
  • In employment, Title VII bars religious discrimination and requires reasonable accommodation. The Supreme Court held an employer could not refuse to hire a Muslim applicant because a hijab conflicted with the store’s “look policy.” In 2023, the Court clarified that employers must grant accommodations unless they would impose “substantial increased costs” on the business (a more demanding standard than the old “de minimis” test). (supreme.justia.com)
  • In prisons, RLUIPA requires strong accommodation of religious exercise. The Court unanimously allowed a Muslim inmate to grow a short beard. (supreme.justia.com)
  • Public employees’ individual religious expression is protected when it does not amount to government-endorsed prayer; the Court sided with a public-school coach’s brief personal prayer after games. (supreme.justia.com)
  1. Private use of Islamic principles can be valid if handled with “neutral principles of law”
  • Courts routinely enforce religiously inspired contracts and voluntary arbitration if they meet ordinary contract/arbitration rules and do not require courts to decide religious questions. Examples include enforcement of Islamic marriage “mahr” agreements and party-stipulated arbitration before a Muslim tribunal, evaluated under secular contract and arbitration law. (caselaw.findlaw.com)

What this means for the question you asked

  • Islam is not “unconstitutional,” and U.S. law does not ban “Sharia” as a set of beliefs or private religious norms. The Constitution simultaneously:
    • Forbids the state from establishing religious law as civil law; and
    • Protects Muslims’ free exercise in worship, dress, diet, prayer, contracting, and voluntary dispute resolution—subject to neutral laws and public policy limits. Attempts to single out Islam (e.g., bans on “considering Sharia”) have been struck down, while harmful conduct remains illegal regardless of religious motivation. (constitution.congress.gov)

Select historical cases and statutes (with brief notes)

  • Torcaso v. Watkins (1961): States may not impose religious tests for office; reinforces Article VI and the Religion Clauses. (law.cornell.edu)
  • Employment Division v. Smith (1990): Neutral, generally applicable laws may be applied even if they incidentally burden religion. (supreme.justia.com)
  • Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah (1993): Government cannot target religious practice; strict scrutiny applies to anti-religious targeting. (supreme.justia.com)
  • Reynolds v. United States (1879): No religious defense to bigamy; belief does not excuse violation of criminal law. (supreme.justia.com)
  • Awad v. Ziriax (10th Cir. 2012): Oklahoma’s anti‑Sharia amendment violated the First Amendment by singling out one religion. (law.justia.com)
  • EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch (2015): Employer cannot refuse to hire because of a religious practice (hijab). (supreme.justia.com)
  • Groff v. DeJoy (2023): Religious accommodations under Title VII may be denied only for “undue hardship” meaning substantial increased costs. (supreme.justia.com)
  • Holt v. Hobbs (2015): RLUIPA requires accommodation of a Muslim prisoner’s beard. (supreme.justia.com)
  • S.D. v. M.J.R. (N.J. App. Div. 2010): Religious beliefs cannot negate criminal intent in assault/sexual‑assault context. (law.justia.com)
  • Odatalla v. Odatalla (N.J. 2002), Aziz v. Aziz (N.Y. 1985), Akileh v. Elchahal (Fla. 1996), Jabri v. Qaddura (Tex. App. 2003): Courts may enforce mahr agreements or arbitral awards anchored in Islamic principles if they satisfy secular contract/arbitration law and public policy. (caselaw.findlaw.com)
  • 18 U.S.C. § 116 (STOP FGM Act of 2020): Federal criminal ban on female genital mutilation of minors. (law.cornell.edu)
  • McGowan v. Maryland (1961): Overlap between secular laws and religious norms can be constitutional if the law has a secular purpose and effect. (supreme.justia.com)

Bottom line

  • Neither “Sharia law” nor “aspects of Mohammedanism/Islam” are unconstitutional as beliefs or private religious norms. The Constitution bars governments from establishing religious law and from targeting a particular faith; it protects the free exercise of Islam alongside other religions, while leaving in place neutral laws that apply to everyone. (constitution.congress.gov)

Internet references used

  • U.S. Constitution, First Amendment, Article VI (No Religious Test), Fourteenth Amendment (incorporation) — Constitution Annotated and LII resources. (constitution.congress.gov)
  • Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961). (law.cornell.edu)
  • Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). (supreme.justia.com)
  • Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). (supreme.justia.com)
  • Awad v. Ziriax, 10th Cir. (2012). (law.justia.com)
  • EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 575 U.S. 768 (2015). (supreme.justia.com)
  • Groff v. DeJoy, 600 U.S. 447 (2023). (supreme.justia.com)
  • Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352 (2015). (supreme.justia.com)
  • S.D. v. M.J.R., 415 N.J. Super. 417 (App. Div. 2010). (law.justia.com)
  • Odatalla v. Odatalla, 355 N.J. Super. 305 (Ch. Div. 2002); Aziz v. Aziz, 127 Misc.2d 1013 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985); Akileh v. Elchahal, 666 So.2d 246 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Jabri v. Qaddura, 108 S.W.3d 404 (Tex. App. 2003). (caselaw.findlaw.com)
  • McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). (supreme.justia.com)
  • 18 U.S.C. § 116 (STOP FGM Act of 2020). (law.cornell.edu)

Sources from the knowledge base used

  • Text of the U.S. Constitution: First Amendment; Fourteenth Amendment; Article VI, Clause 3 (No Religious Test).
  • Historical Supreme Court doctrines on: belief–action distinction (Reynolds v. United States), neutral laws of general applicability (Employment Division v. Smith), anti-targeting principle (Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye), no religious tests (Torcaso v. Watkins), and secular-purpose analysis for overlapping moral legislation (McGowan v. Maryland).
  • General principles of contract and arbitration enforceability under neutral principles of law as applied to religious agreements (illustrated by Odatalla, Aziz, Akileh, Jabri).

Learn more:

  1. Relationship Between the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses | Constitution Annotated | Congress.gov | Library of Congress
  2. Early Doctrine on Incorporation of the Bill of Rights | U.S. Constitution Annotated | US Law | LII / Legal Information Institute
  3. U.S. Constitution | Constitution Annotated | Congress.gov | Library of Congress
  4. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah | 508 U.S. 520 (1993) | Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center
  5. Employment Division v. Smith | 494 U.S. 872 (1990) | Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center
  6. 18 U.S. Code § 116 - Female genital mutilation | U.S. Code | US Law | LII / Legal Information Institute
  7. S.D v. M.J.R :: 2010 :: New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division Decisions :: New Jersey Case Law :: New Jersey Law :: U.S. Law :: Justia
  8. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. | 575 U.S. 768 (2015) | Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center
  9. Holt v. Hobbs | 574 U.S. 352 (2015) | Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center
  10. Kennedy v. Bremerton School District | 597 U.S. ___ (2022) | Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center
  11. ODATALLA v. ODATALLA (2002) | FindLaw
  12. Roy R. TORCASO, Appellant, v. Clayton K. WATKINS, Clerk of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Maryland. | Supreme Court | US Law | LII / Legal Information Institute
  13. Reynolds v. United States | 98 U.S. 145 (1878) | Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center
  14. Awad v. Ziriax, et al, No. 10-6273 (10th Cir. 2012) :: Justia
  15. Groff v. DeJoy | 600 U.S. ___ (2023) | Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center
  16. McGowan v. Maryland | 366 U.S. 420 (1961) | Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center

In addition:

Here’s a deeper cut on how the Constitution and U.S. law treat Islam (“Sharia”) and religion in general, with added doctrine, statutes, and case law, plus historical notes and practical boundaries.

Key constitutional text implicated

  • First Amendment, Religion Clauses (Free Exercise and Establishment). Applied to states via the Fourteenth Amendment. Cantwell v. Connecticut incorporated Free Exercise (1940); Everson v. Board of Education incorporated Establishment (1947). (supreme.justia.com)
  • Fourteenth Amendment, Due Process/Equal Protection (vehicle for incorporation and anti-discrimination principles). (supreme.justia.com)
  • Article VI, Clause 3 (No Religious Test for office). (congress.gov)
  • Article VI, Clause 2 (Supremacy Clause: Constitution, federal statutes, and treaties are the supreme Law of the Land). (constitution.congress.gov)

Doctrinal pillars that define the boundaries

  • Neutral, generally applicable laws may be enforced even if they incidentally burden religion; targeting a faith triggers strict scrutiny.
    • Employment Division v. Smith (1990) (neutral, generally applicable rule governs). (supreme.justia.com)
    • Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah (1993) (city can’t target a specific religion). (supreme.justia.com)
  • Government may not adopt religious law as such (Establishment), but it may accommodate religion and need not be hostile to religion when enforcing secular laws. See the Constitution Annotated overview of the Religion Clauses. (constitution.congress.gov)
  • Incorporation and neutrality protect minority faiths (including Muslims) against both establishment and discriminatory burdens. Cantwell; Everson. (supreme.justia.com)

Modern statutory protections that often arise with Islamic practice

  • RFRA (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-2) applies to the federal government and restores strict scrutiny for substantial burdens on religious exercise. Key cases:
    • Gonzales v. O Centro (2006) (strict scrutiny applied; government must show least restrictive means). (supreme.justia.com)
    • Burwell v. Hobby Lobby (2014) (closely held corporations can raise RFRA claims). (supreme.justia.com)
    • Statutory text (current U.S. Code). (uscode.house.gov)
  • RLUIPA (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc et seq.) protects religious land use and institutionalized persons.
    • Land use: DOJ’s “Place to Worship” initiative; e.g., Bernards Township, NJ mosque settlement. (justice.gov)
    • Prisons: Holt v. Hobbs (2015) (Muslim inmate beard), Ramirez v. Collier (2022) (audible prayer/laying on of hands at execution). (supreme.justia.com)

Where “Sharia bans” and similar measures failed or morphed

  • Singling out “Sharia” violated the First Amendment: Awad v. Ziriax (10th Cir. 2012) enjoined Oklahoma’s “Save Our State” amendment that forbade courts from “considering or using Sharia,” because it targeted one religion. (law.justia.com)
  • After Awad, many proposals became facially neutral “foreign law bans.” Research notes their legal and practical problems and the anti-Muslim impetus. See Brennan Center reports and Pew’s survey of state activity. (brennancenter.org)

How courts treat private use of Islamic principles

  • Courts can enforce religiously inspired agreements (e.g., mahr/dower) and religious arbitration if they can apply neutral principles of secular law and no public policy is violated.
    • Odatalla v. Odatalla (N.J. 2002) enforced a mahr as a simple contract under “neutral principles” (Jones v. Wolf provides the framework). (caselaw.findlaw.com)
    • Jabri v. Qaddura (Tex. App. 2003) enforced an agreement to arbitrate before a “Texas Islamic Court,” under ordinary arbitration law. (FAA: 9 U.S.C. § 2). (caselaw.findlaw.com)
    • The constitutional hook is that courts avoid deciding theology and instead apply secular doctrines like contracts, evidence, and arbitration. See Jones v. Wolf. (supreme.justia.com)

What government may not do

  • Government may not target Islam or express official hostility to a believer’s faith when enforcing neutral laws. Masterpiece Cakeshop (2018) condemned adjudicatory hostility to religious belief; Roman Catholic Diocese v. Cuomo (2020) and Tandon v. Newsom (2021) illustrate modern Free Exercise scrutiny when comparable secular activities get better treatment. (supreme.justia.com)
  • Government may not impose religious tests or bar Muslims from office or public benefits. Article VI, No Religious Test. (congress.gov)
  • Government may not adopt “religious law” as civil law. Establishment principles summarized by the Constitution Annotated. (constitution.congress.gov)

What individuals may not do (even if religiously motivated)

  • Criminal or harmful conduct remains illegal regardless of religious motivation: classic example is polygamy (Reynolds v. United States, 1879); more recently, New Jersey rejected a “religious belief” excuse for sexual assault in S.D. v. M.J.R. (supreme.justia.com)

Robust protection and accommodation in practice

  • Employment: Title VII bars religious discrimination and requires reasonable accommodation; EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch (2015) held an employer may not refuse to hire due to a religious practice (e.g., hijab) if accommodation would not cause undue hardship. In Groff v. DeJoy (2023), the Court raised the bar: “undue hardship” means substantial increased costs, not just “more than de minimis.” (supreme.justia.com)
  • Schools and public employees: personal, private religious expression is protected when not government endorsement; Kennedy v. Bremerton (2022) protects a public-school coach’s brief personal prayer. (supreme.justia.com)
  • Prisons and death chamber access: RLUIPA requires accommodations like beards (Holt) and clergy presence/touch/prayer at executions (Ramirez). (supreme.justia.com)
  • Land use: DOJ has repeatedly enforced RLUIPA to protect mosque siting and expansion (e.g., Islamic Society of Basking Ridge). (justice.gov)

Historical context often cited

  • The 1797 Treaty of Tripoli (Article 11 in the Barlow English text) assured a Muslim state that “the Government of the United States of America is not in any sense founded on the Christian Religion,” a diplomatic signal of non-establishment and amity—though historians note textual complexities across versions. It’s a historical marker, not a controlling constitutional rule. (avalon.law.yale.edu)

National security/immigration note sometimes raised in debates about Islam

  • Trump v. Hawaii (2018) upheld the third iteration of the travel restrictions under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) after extensive revisions; the Court emphasized deference in immigration/national security while controversies over anti-Muslim animus were argued in the background. This case concerns entry policy, not domestic religious status or rights. (supreme.justia.com)

Bottom line, with added nuance

  • Islam is not “unconstitutional.” The Constitution forbids government from establishing religious law and from singling out a faith for disfavor, while protecting Muslims’ free exercise—worship, religious dress, diet, prayer, contracting, and voluntary arbitration—subject to neutral, generally applicable laws and ordinary public-policy limits. Courts routinely apply neutral principles to enforce secular terms of agreements influenced by religious norms and to require meaningful accommodations under RFRA, RLUIPA, and Title VII. (constitution.congress.gov)

Internet references used

  • Constitution Annotated, Religion Clauses overview; First Amendment incorporation and doctrine. (constitution.congress.gov)
  • Article VI (Supremacy; No Religious Test). (constitution.congress.gov)
  • Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). (supreme.justia.com)
  • Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); Church of the Lukumi, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). (supreme.justia.com)
  • RFRA statutory text; Gonzales v. O Centro, 546 U.S. 418 (2006); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. 682 (2014). (uscode.house.gov)
  • RLUIPA overview and enforcement; DOJ Place to Worship; Bernards Township (Islamic Society of Basking Ridge) settlement. (justice.gov)
  • Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352 (2015); Ramirez v. Collier, 595 U.S. ___ (2022). (supreme.justia.com)
  • Title VII: EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 575 U.S. 768 (2015); Groff v. DeJoy, 600 U.S. ___ (2023). (supreme.justia.com)
  • Odatalla v. Odatalla, 355 N.J. Super. 305 (2002); Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979); FAA 9 U.S.C. § 2; Jabri v. Qaddura, 108 S.W.3d 404 (Tex. App. 2003). (caselaw.findlaw.com)
  • S.D. v. M.J.R., 415 N.J. Super. 417 (App. Div. 2010); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879). (law.justia.com)
  • Anti-foreign-law/anti-Sharia measures: Brennan Center analyses; Pew survey. (brennancenter.org)
  • Treaty of Tripoli (Avalon Project and editorial notes). (avalon.law.yale.edu)
  • Kennedy v. Bremerton School District, 597 U.S. ___ (2022); Masterpiece Cakeshop, 584 U.S. ___ (2018); Roman Catholic Diocese v. Cuomo, 592 U.S. ___ (2020); Tandon v. Newsom, 593 U.S. ___ (2021). (supreme.justia.com)
  • Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. ___ (2018). (supreme.justia.com)

Sources from the knowledge base used

  • Text of the U.S. Constitution: First Amendment; Fourteenth Amendment; Article VI (Supremacy Clause; No Religious Test Clause).
  • General Supreme Court doctrines on: neutral and generally applicable laws (Employment Division v. Smith), anti-targeting principle (Church of Lukumi), belief–action distinction (Reynolds), incorporation (Cantwell; Everson), neutrality/no hostility (Masterpiece), modern Free Exercise analysis in emergency/public-health settings (Roman Catholic Diocese; Tandon), and personal public-employee religious expression (Kennedy).
  • Neutral principles of law and private religious agreements/arbitration (Jones v. Wolf; Odatalla; Jabri).
  • Federal statutory accommodation regimes and leading cases: RFRA (O Centro; Hobby Lobby) and RLUIPA (Holt; Ramirez).
  • DOJ enforcement practice under RLUIPA concerning mosque siting and institutionalized persons.

Learn more:

  1. Cantwell v. Connecticut | 310 U.S. 296 (1940) | Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center
  2. AUTHENTICATED
  3. Article VI | Browse | Constitution Annotated | Congress.gov | Library of Congress
  4. Employment Division v. Smith | 494 U.S. 872 (1990) | Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center
  5. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah | 508 U.S. 520 (1993) | Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center
  6. Relationship Between the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses | Constitution Annotated | Congress.gov | Library of Congress
  7. Gonzales v. O Centro EspĂ­rita Beneficente UniĂ£o do Vegetal | 546 U.S. 418 (2006) | Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center
  8. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. | 573 U.S. 682 (2014) | Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center
  9. https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=%28title%3A42+section%3A2000bb-1+edition%3Aprelim%29&utm_source=openai
  10. Civil Rights Division | Place to Worship Initiative - What is RLUIPA?
  11. Holt v. Hobbs | 574 U.S. 352 (2015) | Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center
  12. Awad v. Ziriax, et al, No. 10-6273 (10th Cir. 2012) :: Justia
  13. Foreign Law Bans: Legal Uncertainties and Practical Problems | Brennan Center for Justice
  14. ODATALLA v. ODATALLA (2002) | FindLaw
  15. JABRI v. QADDURA (2003) | FindLaw
  16. Jones v. Wolf | 442 U.S. 595 (1979) | Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center
  17. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission | 584 U.S. ___ (2018) | Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center
  18. Reynolds v. United States | 98 U.S. 145 (1878) | Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center
  19. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. | 575 U.S. 768 (2015) | Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center
  20. Kennedy v. Bremerton School District | 597 U.S. ___ (2022) | Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center
  21. District of New Jersey | Bernards Township Settles Federal Civil Suit, Agrees To Allow Islamic Society To Build Mosque | United States Department of Justice
  22. Avalon Project - The Barbary Treaties 1786-1816 - Treaty of Peace and Friendship, Signed at Tripoli November 4, 1796
  23. 17-965 Trump v. Hawaii (06/26/2018)
  24. Civil Rights Division | Religious Land Use And Institutionalized Persons Act
  25. S.D v. M.J.R :: 2010 :: New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division Decisions :: New Jersey Case Law :: New Jersey Law :: U.S. Law :: Justia

Finally:

Declaring mohammedanism a cult, worldview, or ideology rather than a religion:


  • The government cannot strip Islam of constitutional protection by relabeling it a “cult,” “worldview,” or “ideology.” Courts—not legislatures or agencies—decide what counts as “religion,” and they focus on sincerity and the nature of the beliefs/practices, not government labels or theological “truth.” Attempts to relabel a faith to deny protections would almost certainly be struck down as denominational discrimination or targeting, which triggers strict scrutiny. (supreme.justia.com)

Constitutional text implicated

  • First Amendment
    • Free Exercise Clause (government may not prohibit religious exercise) and Establishment Clause (government may not favor or disfavor faiths or adopt religious law). (constitution.congress.gov)
    • Free Speech, Press, Assembly, and Petition (protect ideological advocacy and association, even if a belief system were rebranded as “ideology”). (supreme.justia.com)
  • Fourteenth Amendment
    • Due Process/Equal Protection (incorporates the Religion Clauses against states; forbids intentional targeting of a faith). (constitution.congress.gov)
  • Article VI
    • No Religious Test for public office (government may not disfavor or exclude people based on religion). (constitution.congress.gov)

How courts decide what is “religion” (not the government’s label)

  • Courts will not judge the truth or falsity of a belief; they may examine sincerity. Key cases: United States v. Ballard; Thomas v. Review Board; Frazee v. Illinois. (supreme.justia.com)
  • Functional tests help identify “religion”:
    • Seeger and Welsh (conscientious objector cases) broadened “religious training and belief” to include deeply held moral/ethical convictions parallel to theistic belief. (supreme.justia.com)
    • Malnak v. Yogi and Africa v. Pennsylvania assessed whether a system addresses ultimate concerns and has structural features of religion; these cases show courts—not politicians—apply neutral criteria. (casemine.com)
  • Statutory definitions are broad:
    • Title VII: “religion” includes all aspects of observance and practice, as well as belief.
    • RFRA/RLUIPA: “religious exercise” includes any exercise of religion, whether or not central or compelled. (uscode.house.gov)

Why a relabeling gambit would almost certainly be unconstitutional

  • Targeting one faith (e.g., declaring “Islam is a cult/ideology, not a religion”) is a forbidden denominational preference under the Establishment Clause and triggers strict scrutiny (Larson v. Valente). The government cannot evade Free Exercise by wordplay or pretext. (supreme.justia.com)
  • Anti-Muslim targeting has been enjoined before: the Tenth Circuit blocked Oklahoma’s “Sharia ban” because it singled out one religion. (law.justia.com)
  • Government officials may test sincerity but not the orthodoxy or “truth” of a faith (Ballard; Frazee; Thomas). The state’s pejorative label (“cult”) is irrelevant to constitutional coverage. (supreme.justia.com)
  • Even when a law is neutral on its face, if it targets religious practice in purpose or effect, it fails (Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye). (supreme.justia.com)

What if a belief system were treated purely as “ideology” rather than “religion”?

  • Much of it would still be protected as speech and association. Government cannot ban or penalize a viewpoint or ideology; content- and viewpoint-based restrictions face strict or fatal scrutiny (Reed v. Town of Gilbert; Matal v. Tam; NAACP v. Alabama). Advocacy can be restricted only for incitement of imminent lawless action (Brandenburg). Providing “material support” to designated foreign terrorist organizations is a separate, narrowly defined crime (Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project). (supreme.justia.com)
  • Government also may not exclude religious viewpoints from otherwise open forums or benefits (Rosenberger; Good News Club; Shurtleff). So, downgrading a faith to mere “ideology” would not let government exclude its perspective from speech fora or benefits. (supreme.justia.com)

Which “parts” could be unconstitutional?

  • As belief: None. Belief is absolutely protected; government cannot punish belief, whether labeled “religion” or “ideology.” (supreme.justia.com)
  • As government action: The government may not enact or enforce religious rules as civil law (Establishment Clause) or express official hostility to a particular faith (Masterpiece Cakeshop). Measures that single out Islam (or any faith) for disfavor violate Establishment/Free Exercise. (supreme.justia.com)
  • As conduct: Neutral, generally applicable laws can regulate harmful conduct even if religiously motivated (e.g., polygamy in Reynolds). When government creates individualized exemptions or targets religion, strict scrutiny applies (Fulton; Lukumi). (supreme.justia.com)

Practical takeaways

  • Islam is recognized by U.S. courts as a religion; relabeling it to avoid protections would be an impermissible denominational preference and/or a targeted burden on religious exercise. (supreme.justia.com)
  • Even if aspects of a belief system are framed as “ideology,” the speech/association protections still bar government from suppressing or disadvantaging that viewpoint, short of incitement, true threats, or the narrow “material support” context. (supreme.justia.com)
  • Government can and does enforce neutral laws against harmful conduct regardless of the actor’s religious or ideological motive, while providing robust accommodations where required by the Constitution, Title VII, RFRA, and RLUIPA. (uscode.house.gov)

Key cases and authorities cited above (by issue)

  • Denominational preference/targeting barred: Larson v. Valente; Church of the Lukumi; Awad v. Ziriax. (supreme.justia.com)
  • Courts judge sincerity, not theological truth: United States v. Ballard; Thomas v. Review Board; Frazee v. Illinois; Seeger; Welsh; Malnak; Africa. (supreme.justia.com)
  • Neutral laws vs. religious exercise: Employment Division v. Smith; Fulton v. Philadelphia. (supreme.justia.com)
  • Speech/association protections for “ideology”: Reed; Matal; NAACP v. Alabama; Brandenburg; Holder v. HLP. (supreme.justia.com)
  • No religious tests and neutrality among theistic/non-theistic beliefs: Torcaso v. Watkins; Article VI. (supreme.justia.com)
  • Statutory protections/definitions (broad coverage): Title VII § 2000e(j); RFRA § 2000bb-1; RLUIPA § 2000cc-5(7)(A). (uscode.house.gov)
  • Hostility forbidden in adjudication: Masterpiece Cakeshop; personal religious expression in employment/schools: Kennedy v. Bremerton; stronger Title VII standard: Groff v. DeJoy. (supreme.justia.com)


Internet references used

  • Constitution Annotated (First Amendment overview; Article VI). (constitution.congress.gov)
  • United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944). (supreme.justia.com)
  • Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Frazee v. Illinois, 489 U.S. 829 (1989). (supreme.justia.com)
  • United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970). (supreme.justia.com)
  • Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979); Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025 (3d Cir. 1981). (casemine.com)
  • Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982). (supreme.justia.com)
  • Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993); Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). (supreme.justia.com)
  • Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2012). (law.justia.com)
  • Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (2015); Matal v. Tam, 582 U.S. 218 (2017); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). (supreme.justia.com)
  • Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010). (supreme.justia.com)
  • Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961). (supreme.justia.com)
  • Masterpiece Cakeshop, 584 U.S. ___ (2018); Kennedy v. Bremerton, 597 U.S. ___ (2022); Groff v. DeJoy, 600 U.S. ___ (2023). (supreme.justia.com)
  • Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j); RFRA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1; RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A). (uscode.house.gov)
  • Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879). (supreme.justia.com)

Sources from the knowledge base used

  • Text of the U.S. Constitution: First Amendment; Fourteenth Amendment; Article VI (No Religious Test Clause).
  • Supreme Court doctrines on: denominational neutrality and strict scrutiny for religious gerrymanders (Larson; Lukumi); belief–sincerity (Ballard; Thomas; Frazee); neutral-and-generally-applicable laws (Smith) and individualized exemptions (Fulton); government neutrality/hostility (Masterpiece); public-employee personal religious expression (Kennedy); strengthened Title VII “undue hardship” standard (Groff).
  • Free speech/association protections against viewpoint discrimination in public programs and forums (Rosenberger; Good News Club; Shurtleff); content/viewpoint rules (Reed; Matal); incitement/material-support limits (Brandenburg; Holder v. HLP).
  • Statutory accommodation regimes and definitions (Title VII; RFRA; RLUIPA) and their application to a wide range of faiths, including minority religions.

Learn more:

  1. Larson v. Valente | 456 U.S. 228 (1982) | Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center
  2. Overview of the Religion Clauses (Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses) | Constitution Annotated | Congress.gov | Library of Congress
  3. Brandenburg v. Ohio | 395 U.S. 444 (1969) | Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center
  4. Historical Background on Religious Test for Government Offices | Constitution Annotated | Congress.gov | Library of Congress
  5. United States v. Ballard | 322 U.S. 78 (1944) | Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center
  6. United States v. Seeger | 380 U.S. 163 (1965) | Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center
  7. MALNAK v. YOGI | Nos. 78-1568, 78-1882. | 3d Cir. | Judgment | Law | CaseMine
  8. https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=%28title%3A42+section%3A2000e+edition%3Aprelim%29&utm_source=openai
  9. Awad v. Ziriax, et al, No. 10-6273 (10th Cir. 2012) :: Justia
  10. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah | 508 U.S. 520 (1993) | Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center
  11. Reed v. Town of Gilbert | 576 U.S. 155 (2015) | Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center
  12. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia | 515 U.S. 819 (1995) | Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center
  13. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission | 584 U.S. ___ (2018) | Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center
  14. Reynolds v. United States | 98 U.S. 145 (1878) | Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center
  15. Clay v. United States | 403 U.S. 698 (1971) | Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center
  16. Employment Division v. Smith | 494 U.S. 872 (1990) | Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center
  17. Torcaso v. Watkins | 367 U.S. 488 (1961) | Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center
  18. Thomas v. Review Bd., Ind. Empl. Sec. Div. | 450 U.S. 707 (1981) | Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center
  19. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project | 561 U.S. 1 (2010) | Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center

Maps of the political spectrum of the US

 

SPOTM Political Map
Timeframe: U.S., roughly 2016–2026. Heuristic, not a scoreboard for teams.

What the map is for

The old left–right line hides the fact that communism and fascism are neighbors: both run life by compulsion and a center. It also hides that “the Right” contains both a rights-protecting constitutionalism and a managerial security state.

The map answers four questions about a system or movement:

  1. Does it deal with people by consent or by initiation of force?
  2. Is power many centers or one center?
  3. Who controls resources — owners and prices, or political command?
  4. Does it answer to reality or to a narrative?

The axes

X — Consent ↔ Initiatory force (main axis)
Low X = opt-in, exit, contract, due process, speech.
High X = mandates on peaceful action, seizure, censorship, compelled association.

Not counted as high X: police, courts, and borders used to stop initiated force (crime, invasion, fraud). Those are rights-enforcing and get a badge, not a shove toward fascism.

Y — Polycentric ↔ Unitary
Low Y = federalism, localism, competing jurisdictions, markets as coordination.
High Y = one administrative apex, nationalized standards, emergency executive.

Z — Property/prices ↔ Political command of assets
High Z = private title + free prices.
Low Z = state ownership or private title with the state directing use (corporatism, industrial decree).

W — Reality/reason ↔ Narrative/identity
High W = evidence, trade-offs, falsifiability.
Low W = leader-myth, sacred identity, “emergency” as a substitute for argument.

T (ring, not a full axis) — long-horizon production vs short-horizon consumption. Debt-as-policy and “live for the clip” score poorly here even when X is only middling.

Origin / Constitutional oval
The U.S. Constitution as intended sits in low-to-mid X, low-to-mid Y, high Z, mid-high W: enumerated powers, federalism, property, due process.
Arrows off the oval: emergency rule → +X; nationalizing state functions → +Y; price control/expropriation → −Z; identity-emergency talk → −W.

Administrative band (not a party)
A shaded band at high Y, mid-to-high X, mid Z: rulemaking, procurement, security bureaucracy. It can cover Democratic administrations, GOP security-state practice, and standing agencies. It is a structure, not an ideology with a mascot.


Placements (0–100)

X: 0 = max consent, 100 = max initiatory force
Y: 0 = max polycentric, 100 = max unitary
Z: 0 = command of assets, 100 = strong private property/prices
W: 0 = narrative rule, 100 = reality/reason

NodeXYZWNote
Communism (ML)9595828Plan + one party; narrative as law
Fascism / NS92922230Title private, control political; leader-myth
Theocracy / auth. traditionalism85825032Dogma over evidence; property varies
DSA / US democratic socialism72723548Open social-ownership tilt; mandate-heavy
Identitarian-admin progressivism (c. 2013–26)68785248Agencies + identity narrative; title still private
New Deal–style social democracy62685858Tax/regulate/welfare; less sacred-identity W than above
Democratic national leadership 2024 (heuristic)66765452Federal standards/mandates; managerial Y
Populist left / left economic nationalism64744850Industrial policy + speech politics
Administrative / managerial state (band center)70865052Cross-party rulemaking apex
Neocon / center-right managerialism56727454Markets + executive/security + industrial tilt
GOP establishment 2024 (managerial wing)55707454Same family as row above
MAGA in office (exec. practice)48646652Border as rights-enforcing (not +X); tariffs/executive +Y, −Z a bit
MAGA rhetoric / coalition average42527254More federalist talk than practice
National conservatism (intellectual)46626856Nation as a good; industrial policy theorized
Paleoconservatism44487056Lower empire-Y than MAGA-in-office
US constitutional conservatism (small-c)34388268Enumerated powers, federalism, due process
Classical liberalism (Founding echo)30368472Rights + commerce; slimmer culture-state than paleo
Techno-libertarianism (SPOTM political target)26329074Night-watchman + production + reason; I-mode
Libertarian minarchist24289072Rights-protecting state only
Anarcho-capitalist14129464Polycentric law; transition/public-goods open
Left-anarchism58221244Low official center; coercion returns via expropriation

Rights-enforcing badge (does not raise X):
objective criminal law, defense against attack, controlled borders against unlawful entry, contract enforcement.


The picture in four quadrants (X–Y)

  • Consent + polycentric (low X, low Y): constitutional oval, classical liberal, minarchist, techno-libertarian, ancap. This is SPOTM’s political home.
  • Consent + unitary (low X, high Y): rare and unstable. A center strong enough to unify everything tends to stop asking.
  • Force + unitary (high X, high Y): communism, fascism, theocracy, hard administrative command. Neighbors.
  • Force + polycentric (high X, low Y): bosses, local predation, militia rule. Unstable; force seeks a bigger center or burns out.

Z colors the dots: greener = markets/property, redder = command.
W is a ring brightness: brighter = reason.


Parties without turning the map into a team sport

Democrats (national, recent trend): live in the social-democratic to identitarian-admin cluster — mid-high X, high Y, mid Z, mid W — with a strong overlap on the administrative band.

Republicans: a split, not a point.

  • Managerial/security wing → neocon/establishment cell.
  • MAGA → between constitutional conservatism and national conservatism; rhetoric closer to the oval, executive practice higher Y.
    Neither wing sits next to fascism on Z or on everyday X (ordinary life is not a one-party command economy).

In this SPOTM version

  • Persons are ends; initiated force is the primary political sin.
  • Fascism and communism are adjacent on X and Y; they differ mainly on the form of Z.
  • The Constitution is an origin region, not a mascot.
  • The administrative state is a band that outlives slogans.
  • Techno-libertarianism sits with minarchy on X/Y/Z and a bit higher on W — the I-mode partner to SPOTM’s spiritual M2, not a merger of the two worldviews.

One-line use:
If a policy moves you up and right by initiating force and thickening the center, it is leaving the constitutional oval. If it only answers force with law, it has not.

Learn more

  • SPOTM: Synchronic Panentheistic Objective Theistic Monism (parts 1–2).
  • A Techno‑Libertarian Manifesto (parts 1–2).
  • George Reisman, Capitalism: A Treatise on Economics. (Clear distinctions among capitalism, socialism, and interventionism.)
  • F. A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom. (Central planning’s coercive drift.)
  • James Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent. (Constitutional political economy and consent.)


Here is the SPOTM map as a drawing: X = consent → initiatory force, Y = polycentric → unitary, with the constitutional oval and the administrative band. Dots are packed in the coercive-central cluster on purpose; that is the point of the map.


How to read it:

  • Down-left is SPOTM’s political home: consent + many centers + property.
  • Up-right is the coercive neighborhood: communism, fascism, and hard theocracy sit beside each other.
  • MAGA is two dots so rhetoric and executive practice are not faked into one point.
  • The gray band is the standing administrative machine; parties pass through it.
  • The green oval is constitutional fidelity, not a personality.

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Here is a second drawing (Z/W color-only)



How to read this one:

  • Up-right: property and argument — constitutional / classical liberal / minarchist / techno-libertarian.
  • Down-left: command and myth — communism, then fascism close by (more title on paper, same narrative rule).
  • MAGA vs Dem 2024 are nearer each other here than the first map’s X–Y spread suggested: both mid property, mid reason.
  • Left-anarchism drops hard on Z even though it was low-centralization on the first chart. That is the point of a second drawing.
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Here is a third drawing ( parties as arrows instead of dots)





How to read the arrows:

  • Head = recent practice. Shaft = where that coalition came from.
  • Democrats: into the administrative band (more center, more mandate).
  • GOP establishment: same band, different color — security and industrial management.
  • MAGA: out of the oval toward national levers; rhetoric still talks back toward federalism.
  • A small teal remnant still points at the oval. That is the SPOTM political target, not a current majority.

Together with the two scatter charts you now have structure (dots), property/truth (Z/W), and motion (arrows).

Systemantics: what is causing the trend away from freedom to statism in the US?

  Here is a drawing ( parties as arrows instead of dots) showing that the recent trend of the political spectrum in the US is to move away f...