This case is fascinating because it involves and integrates psychology. philosophy, a dilemma, true crime, and the legal system.
Did Lindsey Clancy choose to murder her children or did postpartum psychosis negate her ability to choose and cause her to murder them? What does the legal system have to do to resolve this?
Here is the volition chain:
The volition chain, properly understood, says this: a human action can be caused (by ideas, evaluations, habits, even biological conditions) without being “fated”—unless the person’s capacity for rational self-direction is actually incapacitated. The question in a case like Lindsey Clancy’s is therefore not “Were there causes?”—of course there were. The question is: was she capable, at the relevant times, of the primary choice to focus and to be guided by reality—i.e., of rational self-determination?
That is the hinge between guilt and insanity / lack of criminal responsibility.
1) What the volition chain would treat as the central issue
In the chain as diagrammed, the critical nodes are:
- (1) Primary choice: focus vs. evasion (ability to direct awareness to reality)
- (2–4) Choosing governing reasons / premises (ability to select reasons rather than be swept by them)
- (8) Feedback (ability to register consequences as real and controlling)
A claim of postpartum psychosis is, in essence, a claim that these nodes were not functioning in a normal volitional way—that her consciousness was not merely emotional, distressed, or mistaken, but detached from reality in a way that destroys or severely cripples rational control.
So the chain implies:
- If she retained the capacity to focus and grasp reality, then “I had causes” is not an excuse; she still chose.
- If her psychosis genuinely destroyed that capacity at the time, then the action is still caused—but not chosen in the fully human sense that makes moral/legal responsibility possible.
2) What would count (conceptually) as evidence either way
I’m not going to pretend to know the medical facts of this case without records; but conceptually, the volition-chain approach would look for objective markers of whether the action flowed from a reality-guided mind or from a psychotic break.
Evidence consistent with preserved volition (prosecution-leaning):
- Planning and sequencing that shows sustained executive control (choosing means, managing time, avoiding detection).
- Concealment, deception, alibi-building, or staged appearances—not as automatic proof, but as evidence of reality-recognition and goal-directed control.
- Clear understanding of identity and consequences: “These are my children; this will kill them; I will be arrested,” etc.
- Selective rationality: capable of coherent practical thinking in adjacent areas while executing the crime.
In chain terms: intact (5) means-selection, (6) commitment, and (8) consequence-awareness.
Evidence consistent with severely impaired volition (defense-leaning):
- Fixed delusions or hallucinations directly governing action (e.g., sincerely believing killing saves the children from a worse fate imposed by a delusion).
- Disorganized thought, inability to track reality, gross confusion about identity/consequences.
- Inability to use feedback: consequences don’t register as real in the normal way.
- Rapid, incoherent, self-contradictory behavior inconsistent with goal-directed control.
In chain terms: a breakdown at (1) focus/reality-contact and (3–4) rational choice.
3) The volition chain rejects the defense’s blanket slogan: “She had no choice because postpartum psychosis”
That slogan is too undifferentiated. The chain forces a more precise question:
- Was she ill? (Possible.)
- Did illness provide causes influencing her thinking? (Certainly possible.)
- Did illness remove the capacity for rational focus/self-direction at the time of the act? (That is what must be proven.)
Objectivism would say: you do not dissolve responsibility merely by pointing to a cause. Everything has causes. The issue is whether the person retained volitional control of cognition.
4) It also rejects the prosecution’s simplistic slogan: “She knew what she was doing, therefore she could have chosen otherwise”
“Knowing what you’re doing” can mean different things:
- Minimal awareness (“I am performing the motions of X”), which can coexist with severe psychosis; vs.
- Full rational awareness (grasp of reality, alternatives, consequences, moral meaning).
The volition chain’s standard is closer to the second: the ability to focus and be guided by reality and reasons one endorses, not merely the ability to execute motor actions.
5) What the chain would say about “could have chosen otherwise”
“Could have chosen otherwise” does not mean “could have felt otherwise.” It means:
- Were alternative reasons available under the circumstances, and
- Did she possess the capacity to select among them by rational focus?
If psychosis destroyed that capacity, “could have chosen otherwise” becomes questionable in the specific, technical sense relevant to criminal responsibility.
6) Practical conclusion (as a framework, not a verdict)
The volition chain doesn’t let you assume either side’s conclusion. It gives you a structured test:
- Identify the claimed incapacity: which link(s) of volition are alleged to have failed—focus, reason-selection, feedback integration?
- Demand objective evidence for that failure at the time of the act (clinical observations, contemporaneous statements, behavior patterns).
- Separate causes from compulsion: intense causes and pressures do not equal the absence of choice; only a demonstrated breakdown of rational self-direction would.
There are several further (and more precise) things the volition chain adds to this kind of case, without pretending to adjudicate it from a distance.
1) The volition chain reframes “psychosis vs choice” into which link(s) broke
Most courtroom arguments slide into a false alternative:
- Defense: “psychosis ⇒ no choice”
- Prosecution: “some awareness ⇒ full choice”
The volition chain says: locate the malfunction. Postpartum psychosis, if genuine, would most directly impair:
- (1) Focus / reality-contact: the ability to keep awareness anchored to facts.
- (3) Causes of choices: the premises guiding interpretation (e.g., delusions functioning as “governing reasons”).
- (8) Feedback: ability to take consequences as real and controlling.
But other links can remain intact even if these are impaired, such as:
- (5) Enlisted means (basic planning ability),
- (7) Execution (ability to carry out steps).
So “she planned” is not automatically decisive: planning can occur under false premises. The decisive question is whether the planning was guided by reality or by a psychotic “pseudo-reality.”
2) “Reasons” are not exculpatory; the question is whether the reasons were reality-based
An earlier quote is crucial: “Man chooses the causes that shape his actions.” In a normal mind, “reasons” are (or can be made) objective—tied to facts.
A psychosis claim implies something different: that the “reasons” were not chosen as rational conclusions from reality, but were imposed by a breakdown—e.g., delusions/hallucinations that function like coercive internal stimuli.
In chain terms:
- Normal volition: reasons → evaluated by focus → endorsed premises → action
- Psychosis (if severe): delusional content → bypasses/cripples evaluation → action
That’s the conceptual fault line.
3) A key distinction: compulsion vs delusion
The law and psychiatry often use different language, but for your question the chain distinguishes two patterns:
A) “Compulsion” pattern (urge-driven, but reality-contact intact)
- Person knows it’s wrong, knows consequences, but feels an overpowering urge.
- Chain interpretation: (1) focus can be intact; the person may still choose (even if under pressure). Pressure is not the same as inability.
B) “Delusion” pattern (reality-contact compromised)
- Person’s governing premise is false in a radical way (“killing saves them,” “they are possessed,” “they will suffer eternally unless…”).
- Chain interpretation: (2–3) governing reasons are corrupted at the base; the person may be acting purposefully but from a detached “world-model.”
This is why mere calmness, sequence, or goal-directedness doesn’t settle it. You can be goal-directed inside a delusion.
4) What “knew what she was doing” must mean (Objectivist standard)
Objectivism would insist on precision:
- If “knew” means motor/behavioral awareness (“I am performing X”), that’s a low bar.
- If “knew” means conceptual grasp of reality (identity of the act, its finality, its moral and causal meaning, and available alternatives), that is the relevant bar for responsibility.
The prosecution’s strongest form, in chain terms, is evidence that she had:
- intact (1) focus,
- intact (4) alternative-recognition,
- intact (8) consequence-integration,
not merely intact (7) execution.
5) The role of “chosen causes” over time (long-range vs moment-of-act)
The chain also highlights two time scales:
Long-range chain (months/years): character, habits, premises
If a person has a long history of evasion, irrational premises, dependence, etc., those “chosen causes” can set the stage for disaster. But that still doesn’t prove incapacity at the moment of the act.
Acute chain (days/hours): breakdown vs choice
A psychotic episode is alleged to be an acute disruption: the normal guidance system fails. The defense’s case is strongest when it can show a discontinuity: rapid onset of delusions/disorganization inconsistent with prior functioning.
6) A concrete “volition-chain checklist” for evaluating claims on either side
If you want a rigorous way to analyze trial evidence as it comes out, sort each fact into one of these categories:
Evidence about (1) Focus / reality-contact
- coherent vs disorganized speech
- consistent time/place/person orientation
- ability to follow conversation, answer logically
- presence of hallucinations/delusions documented contemporaneously
Evidence about (2–3) Governing reasons / premises
- stated motives: are they reality-based or delusional?
- does she cite “reasons” that show conceptual integration or psychotic distortion?
- are “reasons” stable and coherent, or bizarre/fragmented?
Evidence about (4) Alternative-recognition (“could have done otherwise”)
- did she consider other actions?
- did she seek help, delay, change course?
- did she show awareness of options and select among them?
Evidence about (5–6) Means and commitment
- steps taken, tools used, timing, travel, communications
Evidence about (8) Feedback and consequence-awareness
- did she anticipate legal/moral consequences realistically?
- concealment can indicate consequence-awareness, but again must be interpreted in context (concealment can occur inside delusion too)
Evidence about (9) Automatization/character
- long-term patterns: responsibility, integrity, honesty, prior psych history
- but treat this as background, not as a substitute for acute mental-state evidence
7) What Objectivism would not allow (and why)
- It would not allow the premise “she’s a victim of brain chemistry, therefore not responsible” as an automatic inference. That’s a deterministic evasion: biology influences; it does not automatically negate volition.
- It would also not allow “she’s a mother, therefore she couldn’t have meant it” (emotionalism substituting for evidence).
- Nor would it allow hatred-as-proof (“only a monster would do this, therefore full responsibility”)—that’s not cognition; that’s moralizing without causal analysis.