many possibilities blog: mohammedanism, sharia law and the Constitution of the US

mohammedanism, sharia law and the Constitution of the US

No religion is “unconstitutional” in the United States. Mohammedanism is protected like any other faith. The government may not adopt religious law (including “Sharia”) as civil law, but individuals remain free to believe, worship, and privately order some affairs consistent with mohammedan principles, so long as they comply with neutral, generally applicable laws. (constitution.congress.gov)

U.S. Constitution provisions most directly related

First Amendment (Religion Clauses): “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” These clauses both bar government from establishing a religion and protect voluntary religious practice. Applied to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. (constitution.congress.gov)
Fourteenth Amendment (Due Process/Equal Protection): Incorporates the First Amendment against state and local governments; also forbids government from selectively burdening a faith. (law.cornell.edu)
Article VI, Clause 3 (No Religious Test): “No religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.” Government may not bar Muslims (or anyone else) from office. (constitution.congress.gov)

How courts have applied these principles to Islam and to “religious law”

Government may not target a particular religion or single out “Sharia”

Laws that aim at a religion fail strict scrutiny. The Supreme Court struck down city ordinances targeting Santería; the rule is that government cannot suppress religious exercise through targeting. Courts have applied the same principle when states singled out “Sharia.” The Tenth Circuit invalidated Oklahoma’s “Save Our State” amendment that forbade courts from “considering or using Sharia law,” because it singled out one faith. (supreme.justia.com)

Government may not “establish” religious law as civil law

The Establishment Clause bars adopting religious law as such. At the same time, secular laws may overlap with religious morality if they serve a secular purpose (e.g., Sunday-closing cases). (constitution.congress.gov)

Individuals are broadly free to practice Islam, subject to neutral laws of general applicability

The Free Exercise Clause protects belief and many forms of practice. But religious belief does not excuse violations of neutral criminal or civil laws (the “belief–action” distinction and the “neutral and generally applicable” rule). Classic examples: the Court upheld polygamy bans despite a religious defense; more generally, religious objections do not override neutral prohibitions. (supreme.justia.com)
Some harmful practices sometimes associated by the public with “religious law” are illegal regardless of faith (e.g., female genital mutilation of minors under 18 U.S.C. § 116). Religious motivation provides no defense. (law.cornell.edu)
A New Jersey appellate court reversed a trial judge who excused assault/sexual assault based on the defendant’s claimed religious beliefs, emphasizing that religion cannot negate criminal intent. (law.justia.com)

Robust protections and accommodations for Islamic practice

In employment, Title VII bars religious discrimination and requires reasonable accommodation. The Supreme Court held an employer could not refuse to hire a Muslim applicant because a hijab conflicted with the store’s “look policy.” In 2023, the Court clarified that employers must grant accommodations unless they would impose “substantial increased costs” on the business (a more demanding standard than the old “de minimis” test). (supreme.justia.com)
In prisons, RLUIPA requires strong accommodation of religious exercise. The Court unanimously allowed a Muslim inmate to grow a short beard. (supreme.justia.com)
Public employees’ individual religious expression is protected when it does not amount to government-endorsed prayer; the Court sided with a public-school coach’s brief personal prayer after games. (supreme.justia.com)

Private use of Islamic principles can be valid if handled with “neutral principles of law”

Courts routinely enforce religiously inspired contracts and voluntary arbitration if they meet ordinary contract/arbitration rules and do not require courts to decide religious questions. Examples include enforcement of Islamic marriage “mahr” agreements and party-stipulated arbitration before a Muslim tribunal, evaluated under secular contract and arbitration law. (caselaw.findlaw.com)

What this means for the question you asked

Islam is not “unconstitutional,” and U.S. law does not ban “Sharia” as a set of beliefs or private religious norms. The Constitution simultaneously:
- Forbids the state from establishing religious law as civil law; and
- Protects Muslims’ free exercise in worship, dress, diet, prayer, contracting, and voluntary dispute resolution—subject to neutral laws and public policy limits. Attempts to single out Islam (e.g., bans on “considering Sharia”) have been struck down, while harmful conduct remains illegal regardless of religious motivation. (constitution.congress.gov)

Select historical cases and statutes (with brief notes)

Torcaso v. Watkins (1961): States may not impose religious tests for office; reinforces Article VI and the Religion Clauses. (law.cornell.edu)
Employment Division v. Smith (1990): Neutral, generally applicable laws may be applied even if they incidentally burden religion. (supreme.justia.com)
Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah (1993): Government cannot target religious practice; strict scrutiny applies to anti-religious targeting. (supreme.justia.com)
Reynolds v. United States (1879): No religious defense to bigamy; belief does not excuse violation of criminal law. (supreme.justia.com)
Awad v. Ziriax (10th Cir. 2012): Oklahoma’s anti‑Sharia amendment violated the First Amendment by singling out one religion. (law.justia.com)
EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch (2015): Employer cannot refuse to hire because of a religious practice (hijab). (supreme.justia.com)
Groff v. DeJoy (2023): Religious accommodations under Title VII may be denied only for “undue hardship” meaning substantial increased costs. (supreme.justia.com)
Holt v. Hobbs (2015): RLUIPA requires accommodation of a Muslim prisoner’s beard. (supreme.justia.com)
S.D. v. M.J.R. (N.J. App. Div. 2010): Religious beliefs cannot negate criminal intent in assault/sexual‑assault context. (law.justia.com)
Odatalla v. Odatalla (N.J. 2002), Aziz v. Aziz (N.Y. 1985), Akileh v. Elchahal (Fla. 1996), Jabri v. Qaddura (Tex. App. 2003): Courts may enforce mahr agreements or arbitral awards anchored in Islamic principles if they satisfy secular contract/arbitration law and public policy. (caselaw.findlaw.com)
18 U.S.C. § 116 (STOP FGM Act of 2020): Federal criminal ban on female genital mutilation of minors. (law.cornell.edu)
McGowan v. Maryland (1961): Overlap between secular laws and religious norms can be constitutional if the law has a secular purpose and effect. (supreme.justia.com)

Bottom line

Neither “Sharia law” nor “aspects of Mohammedanism/Islam” are unconstitutional as beliefs or private religious norms. The Constitution bars governments from establishing religious law and from targeting a particular faith; it protects the free exercise of Islam alongside other religions, while leaving in place neutral laws that apply to everyone. (constitution.congress.gov)

Internet references used

U.S. Constitution, First Amendment, Article VI (No Religious Test), Fourteenth Amendment (incorporation) — Constitution Annotated and LII resources. (constitution.congress.gov)
Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961). (law.cornell.edu)
Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). (supreme.justia.com)
Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). (supreme.justia.com)
Awad v. Ziriax, 10th Cir. (2012). (law.justia.com)
EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 575 U.S. 768 (2015). (supreme.justia.com)
Groff v. DeJoy, 600 U.S. 447 (2023). (supreme.justia.com)
Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352 (2015). (supreme.justia.com)
S.D. v. M.J.R., 415 N.J. Super. 417 (App. Div. 2010). (law.justia.com)
Odatalla v. Odatalla, 355 N.J. Super. 305 (Ch. Div. 2002); Aziz v. Aziz, 127 Misc.2d 1013 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985); Akileh v. Elchahal, 666 So.2d 246 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Jabri v. Qaddura, 108 S.W.3d 404 (Tex. App. 2003). (caselaw.findlaw.com)
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). (supreme.justia.com)
18 U.S.C. § 116 (STOP FGM Act of 2020). (law.cornell.edu)

Sources from the knowledge base used

Text of the U.S. Constitution: First Amendment; Fourteenth Amendment; Article VI, Clause 3 (No Religious Test).
Historical Supreme Court doctrines on: belief–action distinction (Reynolds v. United States), neutral laws of general applicability (Employment Division v. Smith), anti-targeting principle (Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye), no religious tests (Torcaso v. Watkins), and secular-purpose analysis for overlapping moral legislation (McGowan v. Maryland).
General principles of contract and arbitration enforceability under neutral principles of law as applied to religious agreements (illustrated by Odatalla, Aziz, Akileh, Jabri).

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In addition:

Here’s a deeper cut on how the Constitution and U.S. law treat Islam (“Sharia”) and religion in general, with added doctrine, statutes, and case law, plus historical notes and practical boundaries.

Key constitutional text implicated

First Amendment, Religion Clauses (Free Exercise and Establishment). Applied to states via the Fourteenth Amendment. Cantwell v. Connecticut incorporated Free Exercise (1940); Everson v. Board of Education incorporated Establishment (1947). (supreme.justia.com)
Fourteenth Amendment, Due Process/Equal Protection (vehicle for incorporation and anti-discrimination principles). (supreme.justia.com)
Article VI, Clause 3 (No Religious Test for office). (congress.gov)
Article VI, Clause 2 (Supremacy Clause: Constitution, federal statutes, and treaties are the supreme Law of the Land). (constitution.congress.gov)

Doctrinal pillars that define the boundaries

Neutral, generally applicable laws may be enforced even if they incidentally burden religion; targeting a faith triggers strict scrutiny.
- Employment Division v. Smith (1990) (neutral, generally applicable rule governs). (supreme.justia.com)
- Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah (1993) (city can’t target a specific religion). (supreme.justia.com)
Government may not adopt religious law as such (Establishment), but it may accommodate religion and need not be hostile to religion when enforcing secular laws. See the Constitution Annotated overview of the Religion Clauses. (constitution.congress.gov)
Incorporation and neutrality protect minority faiths (including Muslims) against both establishment and discriminatory burdens. Cantwell; Everson. (supreme.justia.com)

Modern statutory protections that often arise with Islamic practice

RFRA (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-2) applies to the federal government and restores strict scrutiny for substantial burdens on religious exercise. Key cases:
- Gonzales v. O Centro (2006) (strict scrutiny applied; government must show least restrictive means). (supreme.justia.com)
- Burwell v. Hobby Lobby (2014) (closely held corporations can raise RFRA claims). (supreme.justia.com)
- Statutory text (current U.S. Code). (uscode.house.gov)
RLUIPA (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc et seq.) protects religious land use and institutionalized persons.
- Land use: DOJ’s “Place to Worship” initiative; e.g., Bernards Township, NJ mosque settlement. (justice.gov)
- Prisons: Holt v. Hobbs (2015) (Muslim inmate beard), Ramirez v. Collier (2022) (audible prayer/laying on of hands at execution). (supreme.justia.com)

Where “Sharia bans” and similar measures failed or morphed

Singling out “Sharia” violated the First Amendment: Awad v. Ziriax (10th Cir. 2012) enjoined Oklahoma’s “Save Our State” amendment that forbade courts from “considering or using Sharia,” because it targeted one religion. (law.justia.com)
After Awad, many proposals became facially neutral “foreign law bans.” Research notes their legal and practical problems and the anti-Muslim impetus. See Brennan Center reports and Pew’s survey of state activity. (brennancenter.org)

How courts treat private use of Islamic principles

Courts can enforce religiously inspired agreements (e.g., mahr/dower) and religious arbitration if they can apply neutral principles of secular law and no public policy is violated.
- Odatalla v. Odatalla (N.J. 2002) enforced a mahr as a simple contract under “neutral principles” (Jones v. Wolf provides the framework). (caselaw.findlaw.com)
- Jabri v. Qaddura (Tex. App. 2003) enforced an agreement to arbitrate before a “Texas Islamic Court,” under ordinary arbitration law. (FAA: 9 U.S.C. § 2). (caselaw.findlaw.com)
- The constitutional hook is that courts avoid deciding theology and instead apply secular doctrines like contracts, evidence, and arbitration. See Jones v. Wolf. (supreme.justia.com)

What government may not do

Government may not target Islam or express official hostility to a believer’s faith when enforcing neutral laws. Masterpiece Cakeshop (2018) condemned adjudicatory hostility to religious belief; Roman Catholic Diocese v. Cuomo (2020) and Tandon v. Newsom (2021) illustrate modern Free Exercise scrutiny when comparable secular activities get better treatment. (supreme.justia.com)
Government may not impose religious tests or bar Muslims from office or public benefits. Article VI, No Religious Test. (congress.gov)
Government may not adopt “religious law” as civil law. Establishment principles summarized by the Constitution Annotated. (constitution.congress.gov)

What individuals may not do (even if religiously motivated)

Criminal or harmful conduct remains illegal regardless of religious motivation: classic example is polygamy (Reynolds v. United States, 1879); more recently, New Jersey rejected a “religious belief” excuse for sexual assault in S.D. v. M.J.R. (supreme.justia.com)

Robust protection and accommodation in practice

Employment: Title VII bars religious discrimination and requires reasonable accommodation; EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch (2015) held an employer may not refuse to hire due to a religious practice (e.g., hijab) if accommodation would not cause undue hardship. In Groff v. DeJoy (2023), the Court raised the bar: “undue hardship” means substantial increased costs, not just “more than de minimis.” (supreme.justia.com)
Schools and public employees: personal, private religious expression is protected when not government endorsement; Kennedy v. Bremerton (2022) protects a public-school coach’s brief personal prayer. (supreme.justia.com)
Prisons and death chamber access: RLUIPA requires accommodations like beards (Holt) and clergy presence/touch/prayer at executions (Ramirez). (supreme.justia.com)
Land use: DOJ has repeatedly enforced RLUIPA to protect mosque siting and expansion (e.g., Islamic Society of Basking Ridge). (justice.gov)

Historical context often cited

The 1797 Treaty of Tripoli (Article 11 in the Barlow English text) assured a Muslim state that “the Government of the United States of America is not in any sense founded on the Christian Religion,” a diplomatic signal of non-establishment and amity—though historians note textual complexities across versions. It’s a historical marker, not a controlling constitutional rule. (avalon.law.yale.edu)

National security/immigration note sometimes raised in debates about Islam

Trump v. Hawaii (2018) upheld the third iteration of the travel restrictions under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) after extensive revisions; the Court emphasized deference in immigration/national security while controversies over anti-Muslim animus were argued in the background. This case concerns entry policy, not domestic religious status or rights. (supreme.justia.com)

Bottom line, with added nuance

Islam is not “unconstitutional.” The Constitution forbids government from establishing religious law and from singling out a faith for disfavor, while protecting Muslims’ free exercise—worship, religious dress, diet, prayer, contracting, and voluntary arbitration—subject to neutral, generally applicable laws and ordinary public-policy limits. Courts routinely apply neutral principles to enforce secular terms of agreements influenced by religious norms and to require meaningful accommodations under RFRA, RLUIPA, and Title VII. (constitution.congress.gov)

Internet references used

Constitution Annotated, Religion Clauses overview; First Amendment incorporation and doctrine. (constitution.congress.gov)
Article VI (Supremacy; No Religious Test). (constitution.congress.gov)
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). (supreme.justia.com)
Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); Church of the Lukumi, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). (supreme.justia.com)
RFRA statutory text; Gonzales v. O Centro, 546 U.S. 418 (2006); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. 682 (2014). (uscode.house.gov)
RLUIPA overview and enforcement; DOJ Place to Worship; Bernards Township (Islamic Society of Basking Ridge) settlement. (justice.gov)
Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352 (2015); Ramirez v. Collier, 595 U.S. ___ (2022). (supreme.justia.com)
Title VII: EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 575 U.S. 768 (2015); Groff v. DeJoy, 600 U.S. ___ (2023). (supreme.justia.com)
Odatalla v. Odatalla, 355 N.J. Super. 305 (2002); Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979); FAA 9 U.S.C. § 2; Jabri v. Qaddura, 108 S.W.3d 404 (Tex. App. 2003). (caselaw.findlaw.com)
S.D. v. M.J.R., 415 N.J. Super. 417 (App. Div. 2010); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879). (law.justia.com)
Anti-foreign-law/anti-Sharia measures: Brennan Center analyses; Pew survey. (brennancenter.org)
Treaty of Tripoli (Avalon Project and editorial notes). (avalon.law.yale.edu)
Kennedy v. Bremerton School District, 597 U.S. ___ (2022); Masterpiece Cakeshop, 584 U.S. ___ (2018); Roman Catholic Diocese v. Cuomo, 592 U.S. ___ (2020); Tandon v. Newsom, 593 U.S. ___ (2021). (supreme.justia.com)
Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. ___ (2018). (supreme.justia.com)

Sources from the knowledge base used

Text of the U.S. Constitution: First Amendment; Fourteenth Amendment; Article VI (Supremacy Clause; No Religious Test Clause).
General Supreme Court doctrines on: neutral and generally applicable laws (Employment Division v. Smith), anti-targeting principle (Church of Lukumi), belief–action distinction (Reynolds), incorporation (Cantwell; Everson), neutrality/no hostility (Masterpiece), modern Free Exercise analysis in emergency/public-health settings (Roman Catholic Diocese; Tandon), and personal public-employee religious expression (Kennedy).
Neutral principles of law and private religious agreements/arbitration (Jones v. Wolf; Odatalla; Jabri).
Federal statutory accommodation regimes and leading cases: RFRA (O Centro; Hobby Lobby) and RLUIPA (Holt; Ramirez).
DOJ enforcement practice under RLUIPA concerning mosque siting and institutionalized persons.

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Finally:

Declaring mohammedanism a cult, worldview, or ideology rather than a religion:

The government cannot strip Islam of constitutional protection by relabeling it a “cult,” “worldview,” or “ideology.” Courts—not legislatures or agencies—decide what counts as “religion,” and they focus on sincerity and the nature of the beliefs/practices, not government labels or theological “truth.” Attempts to relabel a faith to deny protections would almost certainly be struck down as denominational discrimination or targeting, which triggers strict scrutiny. (supreme.justia.com)

Constitutional text implicated

First Amendment
- Free Exercise Clause (government may not prohibit religious exercise) and Establishment Clause (government may not favor or disfavor faiths or adopt religious law). (constitution.congress.gov)
- Free Speech, Press, Assembly, and Petition (protect ideological advocacy and association, even if a belief system were rebranded as “ideology”). (supreme.justia.com)
Fourteenth Amendment
- Due Process/Equal Protection (incorporates the Religion Clauses against states; forbids intentional targeting of a faith). (constitution.congress.gov)
Article VI
- No Religious Test for public office (government may not disfavor or exclude people based on religion). (constitution.congress.gov)

How courts decide what is “religion” (not the government’s label)

Courts will not judge the truth or falsity of a belief; they may examine sincerity. Key cases: United States v. Ballard; Thomas v. Review Board; Frazee v. Illinois. (supreme.justia.com)
Functional tests help identify “religion”:
- Seeger and Welsh (conscientious objector cases) broadened “religious training and belief” to include deeply held moral/ethical convictions parallel to theistic belief. (supreme.justia.com)
- Malnak v. Yogi and Africa v. Pennsylvania assessed whether a system addresses ultimate concerns and has structural features of religion; these cases show courts—not politicians—apply neutral criteria. (casemine.com)
Statutory definitions are broad:
- Title VII: “religion” includes all aspects of observance and practice, as well as belief.
- RFRA/RLUIPA: “religious exercise” includes any exercise of religion, whether or not central or compelled. (uscode.house.gov)

Why a relabeling gambit would almost certainly be unconstitutional

Targeting one faith (e.g., declaring “Islam is a cult/ideology, not a religion”) is a forbidden denominational preference under the Establishment Clause and triggers strict scrutiny (Larson v. Valente). The government cannot evade Free Exercise by wordplay or pretext. (supreme.justia.com)
Anti-Muslim targeting has been enjoined before: the Tenth Circuit blocked Oklahoma’s “Sharia ban” because it singled out one religion. (law.justia.com)
Government officials may test sincerity but not the orthodoxy or “truth” of a faith (Ballard; Frazee; Thomas). The state’s pejorative label (“cult”) is irrelevant to constitutional coverage. (supreme.justia.com)
Even when a law is neutral on its face, if it targets religious practice in purpose or effect, it fails (Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye). (supreme.justia.com)

What if a belief system were treated purely as “ideology” rather than “religion”?

Much of it would still be protected as speech and association. Government cannot ban or penalize a viewpoint or ideology; content- and viewpoint-based restrictions face strict or fatal scrutiny (Reed v. Town of Gilbert; Matal v. Tam; NAACP v. Alabama). Advocacy can be restricted only for incitement of imminent lawless action (Brandenburg). Providing “material support” to designated foreign terrorist organizations is a separate, narrowly defined crime (Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project). (supreme.justia.com)
Government also may not exclude religious viewpoints from otherwise open forums or benefits (Rosenberger; Good News Club; Shurtleff). So, downgrading a faith to mere “ideology” would not let government exclude its perspective from speech fora or benefits. (supreme.justia.com)

Which “parts” could be unconstitutional?

As belief: None. Belief is absolutely protected; government cannot punish belief, whether labeled “religion” or “ideology.” (supreme.justia.com)
As government action: The government may not enact or enforce religious rules as civil law (Establishment Clause) or express official hostility to a particular faith (Masterpiece Cakeshop). Measures that single out Islam (or any faith) for disfavor violate Establishment/Free Exercise. (supreme.justia.com)
As conduct: Neutral, generally applicable laws can regulate harmful conduct even if religiously motivated (e.g., polygamy in Reynolds). When government creates individualized exemptions or targets religion, strict scrutiny applies (Fulton; Lukumi). (supreme.justia.com)

Practical takeaways

Islam is recognized by U.S. courts as a religion; relabeling it to avoid protections would be an impermissible denominational preference and/or a targeted burden on religious exercise. (supreme.justia.com)
Even if aspects of a belief system are framed as “ideology,” the speech/association protections still bar government from suppressing or disadvantaging that viewpoint, short of incitement, true threats, or the narrow “material support” context. (supreme.justia.com)
Government can and does enforce neutral laws against harmful conduct regardless of the actor’s religious or ideological motive, while providing robust accommodations where required by the Constitution, Title VII, RFRA, and RLUIPA. (uscode.house.gov)

Key cases and authorities cited above (by issue)

Denominational preference/targeting barred: Larson v. Valente; Church of the Lukumi; Awad v. Ziriax. (supreme.justia.com)
Courts judge sincerity, not theological truth: United States v. Ballard; Thomas v. Review Board; Frazee v. Illinois; Seeger; Welsh; Malnak; Africa. (supreme.justia.com)
Neutral laws vs. religious exercise: Employment Division v. Smith; Fulton v. Philadelphia. (supreme.justia.com)
Speech/association protections for “ideology”: Reed; Matal; NAACP v. Alabama; Brandenburg; Holder v. HLP. (supreme.justia.com)
No religious tests and neutrality among theistic/non-theistic beliefs: Torcaso v. Watkins; Article VI. (supreme.justia.com)
Statutory protections/definitions (broad coverage): Title VII § 2000e(j); RFRA § 2000bb-1; RLUIPA § 2000cc-5(7)(A). (uscode.house.gov)
Hostility forbidden in adjudication: Masterpiece Cakeshop; personal religious expression in employment/schools: Kennedy v. Bremerton; stronger Title VII standard: Groff v. DeJoy. (supreme.justia.com)

Internet references used

Constitution Annotated (First Amendment overview; Article VI). (constitution.congress.gov)
United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944). (supreme.justia.com)
Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Frazee v. Illinois, 489 U.S. 829 (1989). (supreme.justia.com)
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970). (supreme.justia.com)
Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979); Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025 (3d Cir. 1981). (casemine.com)
Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982). (supreme.justia.com)
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993); Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). (supreme.justia.com)
Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2012). (law.justia.com)
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (2015); Matal v. Tam, 582 U.S. 218 (2017); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). (supreme.justia.com)
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010). (supreme.justia.com)
Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961). (supreme.justia.com)
Masterpiece Cakeshop, 584 U.S. ___ (2018); Kennedy v. Bremerton, 597 U.S. ___ (2022); Groff v. DeJoy, 600 U.S. ___ (2023). (supreme.justia.com)
Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j); RFRA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1; RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A). (uscode.house.gov)
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879). (supreme.justia.com)

Sources from the knowledge base used

Text of the U.S. Constitution: First Amendment; Fourteenth Amendment; Article VI (No Religious Test Clause).
Supreme Court doctrines on: denominational neutrality and strict scrutiny for religious gerrymanders (Larson; Lukumi); belief–sincerity (Ballard; Thomas; Frazee); neutral-and-generally-applicable laws (Smith) and individualized exemptions (Fulton); government neutrality/hostility (Masterpiece); public-employee personal religious expression (Kennedy); strengthened Title VII “undue hardship” standard (Groff).
Free speech/association protections against viewpoint discrimination in public programs and forums (Rosenberger; Good News Club; Shurtleff); content/viewpoint rules (Reed; Matal); incitement/material-support limits (Brandenburg; Holder v. HLP).
Statutory accommodation regimes and definitions (Title VII; RFRA; RLUIPA) and their application to a wide range of faiths, including minority religions.

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mohammedanism, sharia law and the Constitution of the US

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