What should Taiwan do concerning a possible attack by China?

 

Taiwan should focus on deterrence by denial: make an attack so costly, slow, and uncertain that Beijing concludes it is not worth attempting. In Taiwan’s own stated strategy, that means “solid defense and layered deterrence,” “multi-domain denial and resilient defense,” asymmetric tactics, decentralized operations, stronger reserves, and whole-of-society resilience. (mnd.gov.tw)

In practical terms, Taiwan should prioritize survivable, asymmetric capabilities over prestige platforms wherever tradeoffs are required. Its defense ministry says it is emphasizing long-range, precision, mobile, and unmanned systems, along with air defense, anti-armor weapons, HIMARS, and other tools intended to deter, delay, disrupt, and degrade an attacker layer by layer. (mnd.gov.tw)

Taiwan should also prepare not just for an outright amphibious invasion, but for gray-zone coercion, blockade, missile strikes, cyberattacks, and a transition from “exercise to war.” Taiwan’s defense ministry explicitly identifies gray-zone incursions as an immediate problem, and recent Han Kuang exercise planning simulated PLA harassment escalating into invasion while testing missile defense, joint maritime denial, littoral strikes, near-shore defense, and resilient fire coordination. CSIS likewise notes that a joint blockade is a core PLA campaign concept in a Taiwan contingency. (mnd.gov.tw)

A sensible military program for Taiwan would therefore include:

• More mobile coastal anti-ship missiles and sea mines
• Layered air and missile defense
• Hardening, dispersal, camouflage, decoys, and rapid runway/port repair
• Large stocks of drones, loitering munitions, anti-armor weapons, and precision fires
• Distributed command-and-control and communications that can survive initial strikes
• A stronger reserve and territorial defense structure for prolonged resistance
  These priorities align with Taiwan’s emphasis on decentralized operations, capability protection, mobilization, and asymmetric warfare. (mnd.gov.tw)

Just as important, Taiwan should keep building civil resilience. CSIS recommends stronger public threat awareness, tighter ties with critical-infrastructure firms, a more resilient power grid, and larger strategic reserves and redundancy in food and energy. Taiwan’s own defense policy similarly stresses a whole-of-society defense approach that integrates military, civilian, and interagency efforts. (mnd.gov.tw)

Diplomatically, Taiwan should deepen coordination with democratic partners while avoiding steps that unnecessarily make crisis management harder. Its defense policy explicitly calls for preserving strategic autonomy while expanding security cooperation with international partners. A credible defense posture works best when paired with clear communication, crisis signaling, and external support networks. (mnd.gov.tw)

So to give a shortest possible answer: Taiwan should become harder to blockade, harder to paralyze, harder to invade, and harder to break politically. That means asymmetric weapons, resilient infrastructure, stronger reserves, public preparedness, and international coordination. (mnd.gov.tw)

Learn more:

1. Ministry of National Defense Republic of China - World Wide Web - Important Policies - National Defense Strategy
2. Ministry of National Defense Republic of China - World Wide Web - Important Policies - Key Points of National Defense Policy - Development and Procurement of Weapons and Equipment
3. Ministry of National Defense Republic of China - World Wide Web - Important Policies - Taiwan Strait Security Situation

In addition:

The biggest additional point is that a China–Taiwan conflict would probably not begin as a clean, obvious “D-Day style” invasion. Taiwan’s own defense materials and outside studies both emphasize that the danger includes gray-zone pressure, sudden large-scale exercises, blockade/coercion, missile strikes, cyber disruption, and only then possibly an amphibious assault. That means Taiwan’s challenge is not just “stop landings on beaches,” but also avoid strategic paralysis in the opening hours or days. (mnd.gov.tw)

A second important point is that warning time may be short. Recent analysis from the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission says PLA activity near Taiwan and large unannounced exercises could reduce the time Taiwan and partners have to recognize a real attack, and could allow Beijing to move from pressure to blockade or assault with limited visible transition. That makes readiness, dispersal, and preplanned mobilization more important than relying on slow political decision-making after a crisis has clearly started. (uscc.gov)

On the military side, Taiwan appears to be leaning further into asymmetric defense: mobile missiles, air defense, UAVs, counter-UAVs, electronic warfare, cyber resilience, and reserve-force improvements. Its Ministry of National Defense says force-building priorities include asymmetric capabilities, defense resilience, reserve enhancement, and gray-zone response capacity. It also highlights force preservation and rapid wartime recovery rather than assuming major platforms will survive concentrated first strikes. (mnd.gov.tw)

Another key issue is blockade vulnerability. Outside wargaming and official Taiwanese planning both suggest that Taiwan cannot think only in terms of battlefield attrition. If ports, energy imports, communications, and power systems are disrupted, Taiwan could face severe pressure even before a successful landing occurs. CSIS’s blockade work and resilience work both stress energy, food, infrastructure, and public endurance as central parts of deterrence. (csis.org)

That is why Taiwan has been pushing a whole-of-society resilience approach, not just military reform. Official materials describe integration of mobilization, air defense, critical infrastructure protection, emergency medical arrangements, civil defense, and local government coordination through exercises such as the 2025 Urban Resilience Exercise. Taiwan’s 2025 National Defense Report also frames resilience and civil-military integration as major pillars of defense preparation. (mnd.gov.tw)

So the fuller strategic picture is this:

• If Taiwan focuses too much on prestige platforms alone, it risks being brittle.
• If it focuses only on beach defense, it risks losing earlier in the blockade/cyber/missile phase.
• If it neglects civilian resilience, it could be coerced without being militarily conquered.
• If it builds survivable, distributed military power plus societal endurance, deterrence becomes stronger. (mnd.gov.tw)

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Learn more:

1. Ministry of National Defense Republic of China - World Wide Web - Important Policies - National Defense Strategy
2. 2025 Executive Summary
3. 中華民國國防部 - 全球資訊網 - Important Policies - Key Points of National Defense Policy - Development and Procurement of Weapons and Equipment
4. Strengthening Resilience in Taiwan
5. Ministry of National Defense Republic of China - World Wide Web - Important Policies - Key Points of National Defense Policy - Whole of Society Resilience